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This Article puts its analytic lens directly on the relationship between technology and legal
change in an attempt to understand the increasingly prominent role of SuperPACs in American
politics. It focuses on the relationship between law, technology, and social change, showing how
the Supreme Court’s view of the relationship between television and the provision of information
to voters in a mass society shaped its decision to extend the First Amendment’s protection of
freedom of political expression to organizations in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission. The Article makes two key findings: first, that technological development may drive
even the most “originalist” law court to underwrite its legal reasoning with normative ideas
about technology; and, second, that when technology management questions surface within the
bounds of a constitutional case, countermajoritarian judicial answers can easily prevail over
those already given by legislative bodies. The Article argues that, under these conditions,
personhood has “shifted” between organizations and individuals within the constitutional order
of freedom of expression, allowing SuperPACs to rise as prominent players on the American
political scene.
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The single most significant phenomenon in modern American history is the
emergence of giant, complex organizations. In the present day it is apparent that
bureaucracies of one sort or another dominate our economic system, control the
central features of our polity, and shape many of the important aspects of our
culture.1
INTRODUCTION
In one of the most widely cited texts on the rise of the corporation in the United States,
historian Alan Trachtenberg notes that the concept of “technology” came into usage during the
decades following the Civil War, in parallel to the rise in the modern corporate form of
ownership.2 This Article investigates the role of that concept—technology—in decisionmaking by
the United States Supreme Court that concerns the constitutional rights of corporations during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It uses this investigation to more fully explain the Court’s
early twenty-first century decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,3 and to
reason more broadly about the role of corporations in our society as it continues to modernize.
As we approach the next U.S. presidential election in 2016, Citizens United passes its
fifth anniversary. The decision remains controversial because it is widely viewed as having
transformed American politics into a clash of “SuperPACs:” organizations that aggregate money
from undisclosed sources and use technologies of mass media to influence the American
electorate.4 After Citizens United found “no basis for the proposition that, in the political speech
1

LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICA, 1880-1940: A QUANTITATIVE
STUDY IN SOCIAL CHANGE 3 (1975).
2

ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE
54-55 (2007); see also RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS 315 (1983) (describing how the word “technology” was used
from the seventeenth century to “describe a systematic study of the arts” or “the terminology of a particular art” but it was
not until the nineteenth century that the familiar modern definition of technology as the practical application of scientific
knowledge emerged), and Leo Marx, Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, 51 TECH. & CULTURE, 561,
562 (2010) (noting the same distinction in the modern emergence of usage of the word “technology”).
3

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

Inaugurating the era of the “Super PAC,” the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Speechnow.org v. Fed.
Election Comm’n relied on Citizens United to hold that organizations making independent expenditures in support or
opposition of political candidates cannot be restricted in receiving contributions. 599 F.3d 686, 696, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
These organizations qualify for tax-exempt status as social welfare groups under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue
Code, as long as their political participation does not constitute their “primary activity.” Raymond Chick & Amy Henchey,
M. Political Organizations and IRC 501(c)(4), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (1995), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/eotopicm95.pdf. For examples of the financial and media activities of SuperPACs, see Abdullah Ansari, Super PACs:
Changing the nature of the game, CAIR-CHICAGO (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.cairchicago.org/2012/08/06/super-pacschanging-the-nature-of-the-game; Peter Overby, How to Oust a Congressman, SuperPAC-Style, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov.
23, 2012, 8:38 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=165761797; Jeff Zeleny & Jim
Rutenberg,
Obama
Yields
in
Marshaling
of
‘Super
PAC,’
N.Y. TIMES,
Feb.
6,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/us/politics/with-a-signal-to-donors-obama-yields-on-superpacs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Matea Gold, Koch-backed political network, built to shield donors, raised $400 million
in 2012 elections, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/koch-backed-political-networkbuilt-to-shield-donors-raised-400-million-in-2012-elections/2014/01/05/9e7cfd9a-719b-11e3-93894
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context, the [g]overnment may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers,” even if the
speaker is a corporation or similar organization, 5 campaign spending in the United States
increased by nearly two billion dollars between the presidential elections of 2008 and 2012.6 In
the latter election, SuperPACs alone spent one billion dollars. 7
This Article links Citizens United and the rise of the SuperPAC to what it argues is a
jurisprudential evolution in the legal status of corporations in the United States, beyond their
nineteenth century designation as “mere creature[s] of the law.” 8 It identifies technology as an
important medium that afforded corporations new capacities to exercise different kinds of
freedom of action beyond simply executing contracts and other financial transactions, the
purposes for which “corporate personhood” originated in law and had long served prior to the
emergence of the SuperPAC. 9 It then analyzes the Supreme Court’s interpretation of technology
within key corporate rights decisions in order to better understand the outcome of rulings that
have brought corporations and similar organizations more fully under the protection of
constitutional law.
The relevance of this kind of inquiry can be illustrated at the outset by considering the
subject matter of the dispute in Citizens United. A nonprofit corporation “dedicated to restoring
government to citizens’ control,”10 Citizens United sought to tell voters during the 2008
Democratic primary that Hillary Clinton was a “Machiavellian” presidential candidate.11 It did not
hire groups of canvassers, however, to disseminate that idea, or publish it in a newspaper; instead,
it produced a documentary it wanted to make available “on-demand” to cable television
subscribers.12 This action ran afoul of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, popularly

09ef9944065e_story.html; Peter Overby, Political Groups Aim Early Attacks at New Hampshire Senator, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Jan. 14, 2014, 3:35 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=262191075.
5

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 312.

6
Evan
Osnos,
Embrace
the
Irony,
THE
NEW
YORKER,
Oct.
13,
2014,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/13/embrace-irony (describing data concerning the rise in spending after
Citizens United, while reporting about Professor Lawrence Lessig’s SuperPAC in opposition to the decision).
7

Id.

8

Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 636 (1819), discussed infra, Part I, pp.

9

See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 109 (1977).

407-421.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the new American states had become involved in the process of promoting economic
development by granting corporate charters and franchises to private investors. Though this pattern has often been
portrayed as economically inevitable, it actually seems to have arisen out of conscious considerations of policy.
See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177-78 (1868) (emphasizing that corporate rights are limited other than “where
contracts or rights of property are to be enforced”), overruled by United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n., 322 U.S. 533
(1944).
10

Who We Are, CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/who-we-are.aspx (last visited Jun. 13,

11

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 325 (2010) (internal citation omitted).

12

Id. at 320.

2015).
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known as “McCain-Feingold.”13 McCain-Feingold aimed to curb what legislators described as an
“ad war” driven by a “flow of negative ads” produced by outside groups in American politics—
groups that were neither political parties nor campaigns.14 It did so by restricting corporations and
unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for broadcast,
cable, or satellite “electioneering communication” that was capable of reaching fifty thousand or
more persons in a state in which a primary election was being held within thirty days, or a general
election within sixty days.15
McCain-Feingold combined a focus on specific kinds of organizations with a focus on
specific technologies of mass media, and left untouched traditional political parties, low-tech
means of communication like the newspaper, and outside group expenditures on things other than
mass broadcast communication. This represented a distinct departure from previous regulations of
campaign finance that were focused on restricting political contributions and expenditures, and
which characterized the entire previous century of electoral regulation. 16
Understood properly as a regulation of technology, McCain-Feingold’s constitutional
undoing in Citizens United can be more clearly associated with strong statements that the Court
made about television in that opinion. These statements countered Congress’ view of a toxic
electoral climate produced by the “ad wars,” with a robust technological optimism about
organization-funded mass media in contemporary democracy. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, described television as “society’s most salient media” and one of “the most important
means of mass communication in modern times.”17 He concluded that “[r]apid changes in
technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel
against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers,”
whether organizations or individuals. 18
We can see here the articulation of a specific judicial understanding of the relationship
between technology and freedom of expression, in which the latter accommodates the former, not
the reverse. Science, technology, and society (STS) scholars call this a “technological
imperative.”19 It views technology as bringing to political discourse certain permanent and one13
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act), Pub L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(2), § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(2) § 100.29(b)(3)(ii) (2014).

148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Cantwell) (“This bill is about slowing
the ad war. . . . It is about . . . making sure the flow of negative ads by outside interest groups does not continue to
permeate the airwaves.”).
14

15
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act), Pub L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(2), § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(2), § 100.29(b)(3)(ii) (2014)).
16

Compare McCain-Feingold Act with Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)), and Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972) (current version at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (2002)).
17

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353.

18

Id. at 364.

Technological determinism, or the idea of a technological “imperative,” is common to an oversimplified
analysis of the role of technology in society. See R.L. Heilbroner, Do Machines Make History?, in DOES TECHNOLOGY
DRIVE HISTORY? THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 53, 54 (Merritt Roe Smith & Leo Marx eds., 1994)
(quoting Karl Marx for the proposition that “[t]he hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society
with the industrial capitalist”).
19
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directional changes to which the constitutional order of freedom of expression must adapt. Thus:
“Rapid changes in technology. . .counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech.” 20
This Article reveals that this kind of thinking did not originate with Citizens United, however; it
instead extended from a series of First Amendment cases that began to address questions about
the role of television in American society, beginning in the middle of the twentieth century. 21
These earlier cases show a distinctive progression. First, the Court noted that television
was exceptionally expensive as a medium for expression, but had become necessary to
communicate across the wide swaths of “today’s mass society.” 22 Under this rationale, it held in
Buckley v. Valeo, in some sense the Citizens United of its time,23 that the expenditure of money on
political advocacy was itself a form of expressive activity protected under the First Amendment. 24
During this same period, the Court determined that the listener’s “right to receive” information 25
within a “marketplace of ideas”26 was of equal constitutional importance as the traditional
speaker’s right to self-expression.
As conceptual tools, both the marketplace of ideas and the listener’s right to receive them
were prerequisite to shifting the legal paradigm governing the constitutional protection of freedom
of expression towards the inclusion of organizations. They provided room within the First
Amendment to protect cheap listening by individuals, for whom television was a receiver, and
expensive speech by organizations, for whom it was a transmitter. As long as the airwaves were
unobstructed, it did not matter whether one was a “seller” or a “buyer” in this marketplace.
Citizens United is therefore the capital on a pillar of reasoning about television that the Supreme
Court built up within its First Amendment jurisprudence after the technology emerged around the
middle of the twentieth century. Under this reasoning, McCain-Feingold was problematic because
it regulated precisely those kinds of technology (broadcast, satellite, and cable communication)
that the Court had already deemed necessary to disseminate ideas to a primarily listening
population in contemporary mass society, and it regulated precisely those kinds of speakers
(corporations and unions) that could afford to produce it.
This Article argues that conclusion is driven as much by corporations’ relationship, as
20

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364.

21

See discussion infra, Part II, pp. 421-432.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (explaining that “virtually every means of communicating ideas
in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money . . . . The electorate’s increasing dependence on television,
radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable
instruments of effective political speech.”); c.f. United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 146 (1948)
(Rutledge, J., concurring) (“Unions can act and speak today only by spending money, as indeed is true of nearly every
organization and even of individuals if their action is to be effective.”).
22

23

Buckley, like Citizens United, brought outside groups more fully into American politics than ever before;
see infra, Part II.C, pp. 427-432.
24

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51.

25

Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“[T]he protection
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”); Constitutional Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 1490,
1491 (1974) (describing the Va. Pharmacy decision and noting, “[t]he first amendment ‘right to know’ asserted by the
plaintiffs is a relatively recent development.”).
26

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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aggregators of capital, to the changes in communication brought about by new technology as it is
about their relationship to the Constitution. Reviewing a series of much earlier cases concerning
railroad corporations, it shows that relationship, too, has origins far older than Citizens United.
Precisely the same relationship between corporations and capital drove the Supreme Court to alter
the way it determined the jurisdiction of corporations under Article III in response to new
technologies of movement during the nineteenth century. 27
With its historical arc and interdisciplinary lens, the Article is able to reframe our recent
debate over “corporate personhood” as not just about technologies of mass communication and
“SuperPACs” in the twenty-first century, but about the role of collective activity in a society
undergoing modernization more broadly. Thus the Article links cases across doctrinal categories
to a larger sociological phenomenon: the rise of organizations as a dominant form of social and
economic order in the industrial and post-industrial United States. It thereby reconciles what seem
at first blush to be two disparate things—the “oldness” of corporate personhood and the
“newness” of rulings like Citizens United—by reading together two strains of social theory, also
one old and one new. First, it notices that the rise of organizations in modern societies, which
thinkers like Max Weber began to investigate at the turn of the last century, runs in parallel to the
rise in constitutional disputes concerning their freedom of action. 28 Next, drawing perspectives
from the field of science, technology, and society studies, it notices that judicial views about
technology are instrumental to the legal reasoning in key cases, but are greatly overshadowed by
the “rights talk” within them. What results is a conflation of reasoning about technology and
reasoning about rights that has placed organizations squarely within the countermajoritarian
protection of our federal courts.29
This Article untangles that reasoning. Its central argument is that a complex mix of
“technologies”—new jurisprudence, new organizational forms, and new technology—has driven
contemporary corporations into a more full form of “shifted personhood” under the Constitution
than these organizations possessed during the nineteenth century. 30 It has shifted because in the
27

See discussion infra Part I, pp. 407-421.

28

See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 337 (Talcott Parsons
ed., A.M. Henderson trans., 1947). Early twentieth-century sociologist Max Weber noted the emergence of organizations
across almost all sectors of human activity in the highly populous and technological societies of the twentieth century,
describing the “development of the modern form of the organization of corporate groups in all fields” regardless of
differences in the type of political economy. Id. He observed that organizations were taking center stage in industrial
societies not only in business, but also in “church and state, of armies, political parties . . . organizations to promote all
kinds of causes, private associations, clubs, and many others.” Id.
29

Probably the most obvious explanation for the conflation of reasoning about technology with reasoning
about rights is that it serves institutional values within law as a profession (however this does not exculpate us within
academic legal thought for missing the role of technology in these decisions). Law and society scholars describe the
function of the kind of legal formalism that shades the technological reasoning in the cases that follow as allowing the
elaboration of systems of logically ordered and conceptually coherent doctrines on which lawyers can make predictions
about the outcomes of legal arguments. Carroll Seron & Susan S. Silbey, Profession, Science, and Culture: An Emergent
Canon of Law and Society Research, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 30-60, 33 n.2 (Austin Sarat
ed., 2004).
30
See, e.g., Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 543 (“Being the mere creature of law, [a corporation] possesses
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . .”); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall) 168, 177
(1868) (“[Corporations are] artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only those attributes which the
legislature has prescribed…”), overruled by United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n. et al, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); as
discussed infra, Part I, pp. 407-421.
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Court’s own language corporate rights originate from the human beings who are intrinsically
endowed with them.31 Thus Justice Scalia, concurring with the majority in Citizens United,
described a corporation as “speak[ing] on behalf of the human beings who have formed that
association;”32 and, Justice Alito wrote for the majority in Hobby Lobby that protecting the
religious free-exercise rights of corporations “protects the liberty of the humans who own and
control those companies.”33
We face important questions concerning technology and social ordering in our age. This
Article shows how the Supreme Court has answered some of those questions in its jurisprudence
concerning the constitutional rights of organizations. While it has reflected a well-documented
shift in the United States towards an “organizational society,” 34 this activity raises two critical
issues: first, regarding the institutional capacity of courts versus legislatures to reason about the
technologies that enable the exercise of particular freedoms of action by organizations; and
second, regarding the reversability of social orders based on such reasoning when they are set into
motion by countermajoritarian bodies versus popularly-accountable ones.
I. BEFORE CITIZENS UNITED
In law during most of the nineteenth century, preindustrial economic conditions
underwrote a focus on protecting individual freedom of action. Preindustrialism’s distinctive
credo was not a belief in organizations, but a “belief in the effectiveness of individual effort” 35
and a conviction in “the dignity of labor and the moral worth of those who worked.” 36 The
corporate form was but one among many legal tools for individuals to advance their aims; the
partnership was much more widely used. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court recognized corporate rights to hold and transfer property, 37 to make contracts,38
and to sue and be sued,39 yet it continued to hew to a view, articulated by James Madison in a
31

The Framers absorbed an understanding of the Magna Carta (1215) as a declaration of natural rights from
the theories of John Locke, who reasoned in his Second Treatise of Civil Government that individuals possessed rights in a
“state of nature,” and carried those rights into the social compact out of which the state emerged. See PAUL BREST ET AL.,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 25, 147, 152 (5th ed., 2006).
32
33

3434

Citizens United at 392 n.7 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, No. 13-354, slip op. at 18 (U.S. June 30, 2014).

I do not know the origin of the term “organizational society,” but have traced an early significant
use to Kenneth Thompson, The organizational society, in CONTROL AND IDEOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS 3 (Graeme
Salaman & Kenneth Thompson eds., 1980). The phenomena is discussed at length in Part I.C, infra, pp. 416-421.
34

35

THOMAS C. COCHRAN, BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE: A HISTORY 170 (1972).

36

DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1850-1920, at 6 (2d ed. 2014). Of the
era’s prominent “works on work,” Benjamin Franklin’s biography and “Poor Richard” aphorisms are best known for
emphasizing individual occupation as both the principal source of happiness and the foundation of national greatness. See,
e.g., BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD: THE ALMANACKS FOR THE YEARS 1733-1758 (Bonanza Books 1979) (1739)
(offering practical advice from business and scientific perspectives).
37

Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 526.

38

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) 519, 526 (1839).

39

Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 497 (1844).
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1791 speech before Congress, that corporations received “rights and attributes” from government
that, unlike a natural person’s, “could not otherwise be claimed.”40
At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the technological transformations of
industrialism channeled most human activity into new modern organizational forms to meet the
needs of large-scale producers. Corporations came to dominate the economic sector, 41 and as the
century wore on, similar types of organizations arose in government (with the rise of the
administrative state),42 in advocacy (with the emergence of nonprofit and nongovernmental
organizations),43 in work (with the formation of unions and professional associations),44 and in
leisure (with the rise of mass membership organizations). 45 Society at large thus became
increasingly “organizational” during the twentieth century. 46
In parallel, the Supreme Court’s view of corporations began to shift. By the end of the
twentieth century, it would describe James Madison’s view that corporations, “as creatures of the
State,”47 had only those rights granted to them by it, as “an extreme position.” 48 By the early
twenty-first century, the Court would signal that organizations possessed something closer to the
personal liberty of individual citizens. This section covers the nineteenth century portion of that
evolution, looking in particular at the impact of the earliest corporations on the legal doctrine of
jurisdiction.
A. Corporate Personhood is Not New, It’s Old
From the nature of things, the artificial person called a corporation, must be
created, before it can be capable of taking any thing. 49

40

JAMES MADISON, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in WRITINGS 480, 487
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). Compare the debate conducted during the drafting and ratification of the 1787 Constitution,
concerning whether adding a Bill of Rights to the Constitution risked suggesting, wrongly, that government had granted
them. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
41

See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (arguing that management supplanted market forces as the most influential factor in the
economy).
42

See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7 (1938).

43

See LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE
MODERN WELFARE STATE 243 (1995).
44

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL
ORDER 54 (1999) (counting 201,000 nonprofit organizations, unions, groups, and clubs in the U.S. in 1949, and 1.14
million nonprofit organizations in 1989).
45

See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY

59, 63 (2001).
46

See Thompson, supra note 34.

47

JAMES MADISON, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in WRITINGS 480, 487
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
48

First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).

49

Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. 518, 575 (1819) (Story, J., concurring).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss5/2

ROBINSON_SHIFTED PERSONHOOD_FORMATTED_FINALFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/11/2016 10:03 AM

SHIFTED PERSONHOOD

411

“Corporate personhood” is not a modern concept but a centuries-old legal fiction
designed to free economic actors from the inefficiencies of personal mortality and liability in their
business transactions.50 Dartmouth College v. Woodward illustrates this principle.51 Established in
1769, Dartmouth College was set up as a private educational institution to be managed by an
incorporated board of trustees. After the Revolutionary War, the legislature of New Hampshire
passed an act converting the college into a quasi-public institution to be overseen by appointees of
the governor.52 The board of trustees sued, claiming that New Hampshire had violated its rights as
an incorporated organization.53
The case came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1819.54 Chief Justice John Marshall,
whose legal reasoning greatly dominated the Court’s formative early decades, wrote the opinion. 55
He began by defining a corporation:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of the law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. 56
Among the most important of these properties was “immortality, and, if the expression
may be allowed, individuality.”57 Marshall explained that these properties allow “a perpetual
succession of many persons” to be “considered as the same” and to “act as a single individual.” 58
This legal fiction served pragmatic ends. It allowed “a corporation to manage its own
affairs, and to hold property without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless
necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand.” 59 The
need for “perpetual conveyances” was due to the mortality of human beings, which required the
transfer of their property upon death through legal instruments. The corporate form resolved this
difficulty by conveying a kind of “immortal” personhood on individuals associating together in a
business form that would indefinitely survive them. Justice Marshall noted that “[i]t is chiefly for
the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities, that

50
See generally Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY
Q. 3D 51 (1993) (discussing early history of the American corporation).
51

Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 526.

52

Id. at 526, 585-586.

53

Id. at 518.

54

Id.

55

John Marshall served as Chief Justice from 1801–1835. See John Marshall Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM,
http://www.biography.com/people/john-marshall-9400148 (last visited Jun. 13, 2015) (noting that John Marshall was
“largely responsible for establishing the Supreme Court’s role in federal government”).
56
Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 543. Justice Story, concurring in the judgment, gives a fuller but analogous
definition. Id. at 561 (Story, J., concurring).
57

Id. at 543.

58

Id.

59

Id.
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corporations were invented, and are in use.”60
However, incorporation gave to an organization “not mere naked powers . . . but powers
coupled with an interest.”61 This comported with nineteenth-century metaphysics, which was
described as a uniquely human trait the capacity to pursue goals beyond their utilitarian value. 62
With no existence apart from its ends, therefore, the corporation was simply a utilitarian tool,
“created by law, for the purpose of being employed by . . . individuals.”63 Dartmouth College
backstopped this conclusion with familiar nineteenth century reasoning about the obligation of
contracts—not with a theory about the corporation as a rights possessing entity, a theory the Court
would reach by the end of the century. 64
McCulloch v. Maryland, the better-known Supreme Court case of that year, also
concerned the nature of incorporated organizations. 65 During the Jackson administration,
Congress had incorporated a national bank to aid in the collection of taxes, the administration of
public finance, and the repayment of Revolutionary War debt.66 The question of the bank’s
constitutionality arose. Finding it well within the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Justice Marshall emphasized its essentially utilitarian nature, writing in McCulloch that
incorporation was only “a means by which other objects are accomplished . . . never used for its
own sake, but for the purpose of effecting something else.”67 Marshall analogized, “No city was
ever built with the sole object of being incorporated, but is incorporated as affording the best
means of being well governed.”68 Regarding Congress’ lack of express power to incorporate a
bank under the Constitution, Marshall wrote, “being considered merely as a means, to be
employed only for the purpose of carrying into execution the given powers, there could be no
motive for particularly mentioning it.” 69 Thus, it was not fatal that the word “incorporation” did
not appear in the text.
The Supreme Court continued to emphasize that a corporation was only “a person, for
certain purposes in contemplation of law” through the middle of the nineteenth century. 70 In the
60

Id.

61

Id. at 580 (Story, J., concurring).

62
See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge University
Press 2d ed. 1996) (1797).
63

Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 544.

64
See id. at 548 (“This is plainly a contract to which the donors, the trustees and the crown, (to whose rights
and obligations New-Hampshire succeeds,) were the original parties.”); id. at 553 (“[The college’s founders] contracted
for a system, which should, so far as human foresight can provide, retain forever the government of the literary institution
they had formed, in the hands of persons approved by themselves.”); id. at 551-52 (“The opinion of the court, after mature
deliberation, is, that this is a contract, the obligation of which cannot be impaired, without violating the constitution of the
United States.”).
65

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

66

BREST, supra note 31, at 28, (citing BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 114-15 (1957)).
67

McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 476.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 482.

70

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 US (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
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1839 case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, the Court held that a corporation could make a contract
enforceable in a state other than the one in which it was incorporated because the purpose of a
corporation was to carry out economic transactions. 71 These economic freedoms, however, did not
entitle a corporation to the broader privileges of the body politic. Almost thirty years later, in Paul
v. Virginia, the Court excluded corporations from the privileges and immunities of Article IV. 72 It
emphasized that corporate rights were limited other than “where contracts or rights of property are
to be enforced.”73 Therefore, the privileges and immunities of citizens did not extend to
corporations, because the term citizen applied “only to natural persons, members of the body
politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and
possessing only those attributes which the legislature has prescribed.”74
As incorporated organizations began to dominate the economies of industrializing
societies during the second half of the nineteenth century, however, this conception of
corporations as the tools of individuals—not “entities” in their own right—would shift.
B. When the Railroads Changed Jurisdiction
The corporation, in short, was the most powerful and prominent example of the
emergence of non-individualistic or, if you will, collectivist legal institutions
[during the nineteenth century.]75
In his study of how the “visible hand” of managerial capitalism overtook what Adam
Smith famously described as the “invisible hand” of market forces, historian Alfred Chandler
noted that during most of the nineteenth century “the volume of economic activity was not yet
large enough to make administrative coordination more productive and, therefore, more profitable
than market coordination.”76 The resulting absence of large corporations in the United States
provided a cultural underlay for the Supreme Court’s nineteenth century description of them as
“invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.” 77
Most nineteenth century business organizations were local, familial enterprises: if they
assumed a legal form at all, “it was that of a partnership.” 78 Unlike a corporation, a partnership
existed only as long as its founders lived and, when not self-financed, relied on a local credit
71

Id. at 588-89

72

Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868), overruled by United States v. Se. Underwriters
Ass’n. et al, 322 U.S. 533, 543 (1944). The case concerned a Virginia law requiring agents of insurance companies not
incorporated in the state to obtain a license and deposit a large money bond to transact business there. Id. at 168. An agent
of several insurers argued that the law violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause by treating his corporate employer
differently simply because it was incorporated in New York. Id. at 169-70.
73

Id.

74

Paul, 75 U.S. at 177.

75
MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY, at 72 (1992).
76

CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 485.

77

Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 543.

78

CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 8, 50.
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system that used individual instruments like “the promissory note and the bill of exchange.” 79
Goods were made slowly and moved slowly through the economy; there was little need for largescale distribution other than in imperial overseas trading. 80 Telegraph and radio were in early
development, and there were no mass media organizations of which to speak beyond newspapers.
The large corporate establishment remained a rarity: rather, “the home, farm, and workshop still
ruled the early nineteenth- century economy.”81
At the end of the eighteen-seventies, however, technological development and fossil fuel
extraction inaugurated industrialism by freeing production and distribution from the limits of
human, animal, wind, and waterpower. 82 Consequently, average daily business activity began to
exceed what small, personally owned and managed enterprises could easily handle. 83 Successful
adaptors were those businesses that could “vertically integrate” production and distribution under
one managerial apparatus.84 Incorporation was particularly suited to this type of organizational
growth: it could tie multiple business operations—purchasing, production, marketing, and
distribution—together under one corporate umbrella and meet expanding capital needs through
the sale of stock.85 The small firm of the nineteenth century was unable to do these tasks with any
economy of scale; and, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the partnership form of
organization was obsolete. The “integrated industrial enterprise,” in comparison, had “become the
most powerful institution in American business and, indeed, in the entire American economy.” 86
Railroad firms were the prototypes of these modern complex organizations. They arose
earlier than in industrial production because of the particular capital demands of infrastructure
expansion by rail.87 Although government bonding had facilitated the creation of a canal system
among the inland waterways of the east coast during the early nineteenth century, this manner of
financing infrastructure fell far short of the capital outlays needed to build a national network of
railroads.88 Railroads had to be financed in New York City through the sale of corporate bonds
and stock.89 By 1859, investment in the securities of railroad corporations exceeded $1,100
million, and by the start of 1870 there were 70,000 miles of track in operation in the United
States; by 1900, close to 200,000 miles. 90
79

Id. at 22.

80

Id. at 17.

81

RODGERS, supra note 36, at 20.

82

CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 17, 285-86, 485, 76 (discussing the opening of the anthracite coal fields in
eastern Pennsylvania).
83

See CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 348, 363-64.

84

See id.

85

Id. at 1, 285–86.

86

Id. at 286.

87

CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 81-121 (discussing the rise of the railroad).

88
The total expenditures for canals between 1815 and 1860 was $188 million, of which seventy-three
percent was supplied by state and municipal bonds; the New York Central alone, a regional railroad, had over $28 million
invested in road and equipment by 1855. GALAMBOS, supra note 1, at 6; CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 90.
89

CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 91.

90

Id. at 88-90.
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The rise of the railroads threw into disarray a prevailing legal paradigm for determining
where corporations could sue and be sued. That situation is illustrated by an early nineteenth
century case, Bank of the United States v. Deveaux.91 Deveaux, a lawyer acting with Georgia
officials, forcibly collected two thousand dollars in payment of state taxes from a branch of the
incorporated national bank located in Savannah. 92 The bank sued for damages in federal court
despite Deveaux’s crimes of trespass and theft being matters of state law. Deveaux responded that
the bank was not a “citizen” within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution and was thereby
not entitled to diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. 93
Justice Marshall, again writing for the Court, reasoned that an organization “indeed,
cannot be an alien or a citizen; but the persons whom it represents may be the one or the other.”94
This directed the jurisdictional inquiry to the residences of a corporation’s shareholders “as a
subject which the court can inspect.” 95 If the shareholders were foreign aliens or citizens of a
different state from the opposing party in a suit by or against a corporation in which they held
shares, the controversy came “within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction conferred” by Article
III.96 If they were citizens of the same state, it did not. Since no shareholder of the national bank
resided in Georgia, Justice Marshall found that the bank was diverse to Deveaux and its suit
against him could proceed in federal court.97
Railroad corporations, however, substantially problematized this method for determining
jurisdiction. They operated thousands of miles of track over the boundaries of several states and,
to raise capital for this vast infrastructure, sold stock on national exchanges, scattering their
shareholders across the nation. Under Deveaux, in suits concerning a corporation and a resident of
a state, federal diversity jurisdiction was destroyed in any state in which a single shareholder
resided. Thus, insofar as railroad development was contingent on litigation outcomes, as the land
practices that railroad corporations employed suggest,98 Deveaux consigned the fate of these
organizations to precisely those state courts unlikely to favor a national imperative for westward
expansion over their own state interests.
As the railroads became more prominent, however, the Supreme Court began to link
these national interests to its reasoning about organizational freedom of action. In 1839, it
described railroad corporations as advancing “[o]ne of the most important objects and interests for

91
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), overruled by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston
R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (1 How.) 497 (1844).
92

Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 62.

93

Article III provides that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over disputes arising between citizens
of different states. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
94

Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 87.

95

Id. at 90.

96

Id. at 87-88.

97

Id. at 91-92.

See, e.g., JAMES DABNEY MCCABE, HISTORY OF THE GRANGE MOVEMENT; or, THE FARMER’S WAR
AGAINST MONOPOLIES: BEING A FULL AND AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT OF THE STRUGGLES OF THE AMERICAN FARMERS
AGAINST THE EXTORTIONS OF THE RAILROAD COMPANIES 132-65 (1873) (giving an account of the ability of “railroad
men” to capture and use the court system to their benefit).
98
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the preservation of the Union.”99 It explained that “associated capital” was “essentially necessary”
for infrastructure development in the United States, which lacked the “large individual
accumulations” found in Europe consequent to longstanding generational wealth. 100 Under this
reasoning, the Court held bills of exchange drawn by railroad corporations to be contracts
enforceable in any state.101 To do otherwise, it explained, would be “injurious . . . to the
operations of commerce, and the creation and improvement of the facilities of intercourse.” 102
Thus the Supreme Court linked a technological imperative for infrastructure development to its
legal reasoning about the scope of railroad corporations’ freedom of action in a westwardexpanding United States. We will see a similar type of linkage with technology in its
jurisprudence about organizational freedom of political speech in the twentieth century. 103
In 1844, the Court overturned Deveaux, the railroad-obstructive case, in Louisville,
Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad Company v. Letson, which articulated what scholars would
later identify as a new “entity theory” of the corporation.104 The Letson Court rejected the view
that a corporation was a mere legal fiction—artificial, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law—stating instead that a corporation was “capable of being treated as a citizen
of [a] state, as much as a natural person,” and thus its residence for jurisdictional purposes could
be determined by simply looking at the state of its incorporation. 105 The law of jurisdiction, the
Court admonished, must “comprehend citizens universally, in all the relations of trade,” and not
only in the increasingly obsolete forms of the earlier part of the century: “such relations of
business as may arise from their individual or partnership transactions.”106 Later, in Marshall v.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, the Court reaffirmed that “a citizen who has made a
contract, and has a ‘controversy’ with a corporation . . . [does] not deal with a mere metaphysical
abstraction” akin to that described by Justice Marshall in the earlier part of the century. 107
The entity theory was not without its detractors, however. One in particular keenly
identified a technological imperative as driving the theory forward on the Court. A Virginia
lawyer nominated to the Court by Martin Van Buren, 108 Justice Daniel vigorously criticized
Letson in Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, ominously warning that it would
create a “new class of citizen corporations” and, by a “rite of judicial baptism,” set them free from
“the thralldom of constitutional restriction.” 109 Daniel associated the Court’s shift towards the
99

Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 526.

100

Id. at 524.

101

Id. at 525-26.

102

Id. at 524.

103

See infra Part II, pp. 421-432.

104

Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (1 How.) 497 (1844). See HORWITZ, supra

note 9, at 71-72.
105

Letson, 43 U.S. at 558.

106

Id. at 553 (emphasis added).

107

57 U.S. 314, 327 (1853); compare Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 543.

108

PBS.ORG,

109

Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (1 How.) 314, 343-44 (1853) (Daniel, J., dissenting). Daniel

Biographies
of
the
Robes:
Peter
Vivian
Daniel,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/robes_daniel.html (last visited Jun. 13, 2015).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss5/2

ROBINSON_SHIFTED PERSONHOOD_FORMATTED_FINALFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/11/2016 10:03 AM

SHIFTED PERSONHOOD

417

entity theory with the technological drive towards railroad expansion. Deveaux, in his view, was
therefore not rejected for being constitutionally flawed, but for being “wholly behind the sagacity
and requirements of the age.”110 Thus where the majority of the Court had before emphasized the
importance of corporations for “the creation and improvement of the facilities of [commercial]
intercourse,”111 Daniel charged it with placing a “new morality” at the center of its jurisprudence:
one by which it was willing to modify “the mandates or axioms of the Constitution, when found
obstructing the way to power” in a new technological age. 112
Thus the oft-cited 1886 case “establishing” corporate personhood, Santa Clara v.
Southern Pacific Railroad, is but a mile-marker in the history of judicial accommodation of new
forms of organization within constitutional jurisprudence, because the mid-century railroad cases
well-preceded Santa Clara in establishing the entity theory.113 In Santa Clara, the Supreme Court
would therefore simply direct a functionary (its court reporter) to dispense with the challenge that
railroad corporations were not entitled to constitutional guarantees aimed to benefit former slaves
after the Civil War. The reporter dutifully wrote:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question of whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a
State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does. 114
Letson marks an elemental phase in what this Article describes as “shifted personhood”
between organizations and individuals within the constitutional order: Santa Clara is merely
evidence the shift had already occurred. This is apparent in other cases of that era, as in the 1891
transit case Crutcher v. Kentucky, in which the Supreme Court held that “the accession of mere
corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the
effect of depriving [the incorporators] of. . . [a] right.”115 Although it was speaking not of the
individuals but of the organization, the Court noted that “[t]o carry on interstate commerce, is not
wrote that Letson’s holding carried the word citizen “beyond either its philological, technical, political, or vulgar
acceptation,” when there were reasonable alternatives, such as viewing a corporation as the equivalent of a legal alien:
endowed with certain rights but constrained in others. Id. at 339-40.
110

Id. at 346 (Daniel, J., dissenting).

111

Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 524.

112

Marshall, 57 U.S. at 346.

113

Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).

114

Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396. The case concerned the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad, which was
incorporated in 1866 by an act of Congress to “construct and maintain, by certain designated routes, a continuous railroad
and telegraph line from Springfield, Missouri, to the Pacific,” for the purpose of “securing the safe and speedy
transportation of mails, troops, munitions of war, and public stores.” The Southern Pacific undertook to extend the A&P
line; however, by 1875, it was indebted for large sums of money secured by a mortgage on over eleven million acres of
land. It failed to pay taxes on three thousand acres located in Santa Clara County and argued that the provisions of
California tax law imposed “unequal burdens” in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 398, 401-05, 409.
115

Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 54 (1891) (finding a state requirement that common carriers file
proof of a certain value in capital stock when travelling through the state unconstitutional).
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a franchise or a privilege granted by the state; it is a right which every citizen of the United States
is entitled to exercise under the constitution and laws of the United States.” 116
This kind of reasoning drives the holding concerning religious freedom a century later in
Hobby Lobby, for example, where the Court articulated that “[w]hen rights, whether constitutional
or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people [the
incorporators].”117 Similarly, in 2010, the Court used a biological metaphor to explain Letson’s
jurisdictional calculus, instructing litigants to look for a corporation’s “nerve center” to determine
where that organization could be sued, and suggested its features are as intrinsic to it as to a living
being.118 The same year, the Court in Citizens United equated the speech rights of corporations to
individuals, finding “no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the
government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.” 119
The only way to commensurate these statements with their holdings is by concluding that
a fuller complement of the rights of personhood has “shifted” from individuals to organizations
since the time that Alexander Hamilton described corporations’ rights as limited to only those
granted by the state.120 It is the widening of what has shifted, from contractual freedoms (the
subject of the nineteenth century cases), to freedoms of conscience, such as of political expression
(in Citizens United) and religious free exercise (in Hobby Lobby), that would make the relatively
old and established concept of “corporate personhood” reappear as something new and
controversial in the early twenty-first century.
C. The Supreme Court, the Organizational Society, and the Technological Imperative
By the end of the twentieth century, nearly six million corporations had come into
existence in the United States.121 These corporations brought with them managerial capitalism:
they employed hundreds and even thousands of middle and top managers who supervised the
work of dozens and often hundreds of operating units, consisting of tens and often hundreds of
thousands of employees.122 These employees had largely no stake in the organization other than
their wages, and, by that definition, they were easily replaceable. 123 This was one of the facts
about industrialism that would bring about an organizational transformation of government in the
United States during the twentieth century, rivaling that which had occurred in the private sector.
116

Id.

117

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014).

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010) (concluding that “in practice it should normally be the
place where the corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction,
control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center’”).
118

119

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314.

120
See supra, note 40 and associated text. For an extensive treatment of the shift from the “grant” to
“entity” theory in American legal thought, see HORWITZ, supra note 75 [1870-1960 volume], at 70-76 (and particularly,
Chapter 3).
121
There were approximately 5.85 million corporate federal income tax filers in 2008. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012 491 tbl.744 (2012).
122
CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 1-3 (concluding that “modern business enterprise . . . employs a hierarchy
of middle and top salaried managers to monitor and coordinate the work of the units under its control.”).
123

See, e.g., id. at 8 (noting in part that “[m]en came and went. The institution and its offices remained”).
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Industrialism called into question the “Jeffersonian conviction that political liberty was
safe only where no man was economically beholden to another.” 124 While it spread employment
widely, working conditions were typically egregious.125 Whole industries relied on child labor.126
Labor unrest produced strikes, riots, and fertile grounds for anarchism by the turn of the century;
President McKinley was assassinated in 1901 in association with suppression of a workers’ strike
at the American Steel and Wire Company. 127 Financial markets were deeply unstable and the
Great Depression was among a series of major economic crises experienced in the United States
after 1880.128 Control of the new industrial organizations via governmental regulation of
workplace safety, ages of employment, wages, hours, pensions, and speculation in the market
became a central domestic policy issue in the United States during the first decades of the
twentieth century.
Advocating for a new “administrative process” to regulate the market and workplace,
New Deal bureaucrat James Landis argued that the Jeffersonian ideal was obsolete, due to
technological modernization:
The rise of industrialism . . . brought new and difficult problems to government.
A world that scarcely a hundred years ago could listen to Wordsworth’s
denunciation of railroads because their building despoiled the beauty of his
northern landscapes is different, very different, from one that in 1938 has to
determine lanes and flight levels for air traffic. 129
In place of Wordsworth’s ideals (and Jefferson’s), Landis described the emergence
among the American public of a “view which conceives it to be a function of government to
maintain a continuing concern with and control over the economic forces which affect the life of
the community.”130 Landis and other proponents of the organizational transformation of
government urged that it was the only thing that could counterbalance the great power and
effectiveness of the organizations that had emerged in society at large, exercising what economist
John Kenneth Galbraith would later call “countervailing power.” 131
RODGERS, supra note 36, at 33. Also, this is the thesis of Professor Reich’s widely-cited article. See
generally Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
124

125

See, e.g., 141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire; Trapped High Up in Washington Place
Building; Street Strewn with Bodies; Piles of Dead Inside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 2 (describing the infamous
Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire).
126

See generally American Academy of Political and Social Science, Child Employing Industries, in
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. (Vol. 35 & Supp. Mar. 1910).
127

See GALAMBOS, supra note 1, at 222; MARSHALL EVERETT, COMPLETE LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY

AND STORY OF HIS ASSASSINATION (1901).
128
There were panics in 1873, 1893, 1903, and 1907, and depressions in 1885, 1893-97, and 1913-14. See
HORWITZ, supra note 75, at 65-66; GALAMBOS, supra note 1, at 117, 222.
129

LANDIS, supra note 42, at 7.

130

LANDIS, supra note 42, at 8. Landis served as a member of the Federal Trade Commission, chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and dean of Harvard Law School. See generally THOMAS MCCRAW, PROPHETS
OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, AND ALFRED KAHN (1984).
131

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 108-23 (1952) (describing countervailing power);
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Professionally insulated from the emergent conditions of industrial working life, the
Supreme Court continued to embrace laissez faire economic theory in its constitutional
interpretation, blocking implementation of the managed society policies of the New Deal until the
1930s.132 After it dropped this resistance, from 1930 to 1935, Congress built a formidable stable
of administrative organizations in government to address such issues as monopolization, securities
fraud, market speculation, public services, utilities, dangerous industries, and social welfare. To
staff these organizations, it expanded the total workforce of the federal government by nearly two
hundred percent between 1930 and 1950.133 In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act laid a
statutory framework for the creation of further organizations to meet the needs of contemporary
times as they arose,134 and by 1970, non-defense agencies within the federal government
employed almost three million people and accounted for more than one-fifth of the gross domestic
product.135 That year the Department of Agriculture alone employed more persons than had
worked for the entire federal government in 1881.136
Yet the idea of organizational formation as a new way to power was not limited to
government alone. The extensive rise of nonprofit and “nongovernmental” organizations during
the twentieth century formed yet another “associational revolution” rivaling the earlier
development of the nation state, in the assessment of some historians.137 The formation of unions,
professional associations, and other kinds of mass membership organizations for advocacy, and
the widespread emergence of clubs for leisure (satirically portrayed by Sinclair Lewis in 1922’s
Babbitt),138 were twentieth-century vehicles for the progressive new middle class minted by
industrialism to “fulfill its destiny through bureaucratic means.” 139 Later twentieth-century
see also MICHAEL SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN POLITICS 170 (2005) (“If democracy was to
survive, the concentration of economic power would have to be met by a similar concentration of political power.”).
Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating New York’s regulation of maximum
hours in the baking industry to sixty per week and ten per day), with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
(upholding a state minimum wage regulation for women), and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, setting maximum working hours and minimum wages). Much has been made of
Roosevelt’s “court packing” threat in the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937; however, the bill never passed for a
variety of reasons that appear to have little to do with the fabled “switch in time that saved nine.” See MARIAN C.
MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 435-36
(2002). In particular, the Senate majority leader charged with the bill’s passage, and a likely appointee to an expanded
Court, died unexpectedly. Id. at 505.
132

133

COCHRAN, supra note 35, at 320.

134

Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500

135

GALAMBOS, supra note 1, at 3-4.

(2012)).

136

Id. People who grew up in Washington, as I did, know that the entire administration of the federal
government was once housed in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next to the White House. Now the grand
buildings of Constitution Avenue all contain administrative agencies, as do extensive parts of Washington, and Maryland
and Virginia surrounding.
137

SALAMON, supra note 43, at 243.

SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBITT 155 (Dover Thrift ed., Dover Publications) (2003) (describes the protagonist’s
“clubs and associations” as “food comfortable to his spirit”).
138

139

ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 166 (Donald David ed., 1967); see also
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scholars widely confirmed the observation of early twentieth-century sociologist Max Weber:
organizations were taking center stage across all the industrializing societies of the twentieth
century—not only in business, but also in “church and state, of armies, political parties . . .
organizations to promote all kinds of causes, private associations, clubs, and many others.” 140
Empirical work showed how as these societies urbanized and became more populous, 141 they
increasingly relied on organizations for social cohesion, 142 security,143 governance,144 and
economic growth.145 Historian Robert Wiebe summed up the cause of this much organizational
formation as a new kind of “bureaucratic orientation” 146 that found organizations “peculiarly
suited to the fluidity and impersonality of an urban-industrial world.”147 By 1974, forty-nine of
the one hundred largest economic units in the world were nations and fifty-one were international
corporations,148 and by the end of the twentieth century, the growth of nonprofit corporations
outstripped the growth of the population in the United States. 149 Organization studies emerged as
a whole new field of social science dedicated to the study of these new, collective actors in human
society.150
Thus, between the time of Dartmouth College and Citizens United, a deep preindustrial

PUTNAM, supra note 45.
140

MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 337 (Talcott Parsons ed., A.M.
Henderson trans., 1947).
141
See LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES 225-26 (1938) (“In 1800, not a city in the Western
World had over a million in population . . . . [B]y 1900, eleven metropolises with more than a million inhabitants had
come into existence . . . . Thirty years later . . . . there were twenty-seven [such] cities.”); UNITED NATIONS POPULATION
FUND, THE STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 2011 121 (2011) (reporting that an equal portion of the world’s population
resided in urban and rural environments during the first decade of the twenty-first century).
142

See PUTNAM, supra note 45, at 59-64 (2000) (describing the decline of local civic clubs and rise of mass
membership organizations during the second half of the twentieth century).
143

See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 21, 131-32 (Mike Featherstone ed.,
Mark Ritter trans., 1992) (describing modernity’s particular hazards and insecurities as producing specific forms of postindustrial organization).
144

See LANDIS, supra note 42, at 14 (describing the need for a twentieth-century administrative state
characterized by specialized organizations: “administrative agencies”).
145

See generally CHANDLER, supra note 41 (describing the emergence of new organizational forms of
managerial capitalism at the turn of the last century).
146

See WIEBE, supra note 139, at 295.

147

Id. at 145.

148

TRACHTENBERG, supra note 2, at 5.

149

FUKUYAMA, supra note 44, at 54 (citing a Department of Commerce survey counting 201,000 nonprofit
organizations, unions, groups, and clubs in the U.S. in 1949, and 1.14 million nonprofit organizations in 1989).
150

See, e.g., W. G. Astley & A. H. Van de Ven, Central Perspectives and Debates in Organization Theory,
28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 2 (1983). (discussing various debates surrounding four basic views that represent different concepts of
organizational theory); see also Graeme Salaman & Kenneth Thompson, Editors’ Introduction to CONTROL AND
IDEOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS vii, vii (Graeme Salaman & Kenneth Thompson eds., 1980) (describing an introduction to
the analysis of modern organizations and the processes of organizational control).
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connection between individual activity and work, governance, advocacy, and even leisure was
severed in the United States. By the end of the twentieth century, historian Louis Galambos would
conclude that “[m]ost of the things that most of us do each day are either accomplished directly
within this type of administrative network or are indirectly dependent upon the activities of the
great modern organizations surrounding us.” 151 Analyzing shifts in the content of eleven special
interest magazines over sixty years, Galambos reported that the new “emphasis in this value
system was on organizational achievement” and success was increasingly looked upon as
organizational, not as individual.152 That represented a marked shift from the individualist outlook
of the nineteenth century, which was organized, to the contrary, around an “optimistic belief in
the effectiveness of individual effort.” 153
Like the culture surrounding it, the Supreme Court solved the crisis the widespread rise
of organizations posed for a constitutional jurisprudence grounded in liberal individualism, by
shifting to accommodate the new organizational forms. 154 In the law of jurisdiction (or “in
jurisdictional analysis”), this occurred during a period of mid- to late-nineteenth century
American progress deeply entwined with new technologies of movement. 155 To determine where
an incorporated organization could sue and be sued in the early nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court looked to the physical location of the shareholders, 156 but this concept proved unworkable
by mid-century with the rise of new kinds of organizations—vertically-integrated corporations—
that undertook the long-range movement of people and goods across several states using
technologies like the steam engine. Railroad corporations’ presence in American life was
undeniably more than “artificial:” they had a tangible infrastructure of tens of thousands of miles
of track, an employment of thousands, and a capitalization of millions of dollars in stock held by
tens of thousands of shareholders across the nation. Basing jurisdiction on the location of these
shareholders was deeply problematic for the forward progress of westward expansion, because it
meant that railroads had to litigate primarily in state courts.
Incorporated organizations and railroad technology were closely aligned because of the
particular need to aggregate large sums of capital to develop this kind of infrastructure. Noting the
lack in the United States of large aristocratic fortunes, the Supreme Court remarked that only an
antiquated view would recognize citizens only in obsolete forms like individual or partnership
151

GALAMBOS, supra note 1, at 3.

Id. at 221; but see J. Morgan Kousser, Louis Galambos’s The Public Image of Big Business in America
1880-1940: A Quantitative Study in Social Change, 63 J. AMER. HIST. 437-38 (1975) (book review) (critiquing
Galambos’s methodology as “pseudo-statistical,” “impressionistic,” and underwritten by the assumption that his published
sources “reflect rather than produce mass attitudes.”).
152

153

COCHRAN, supra note 35, at 170.

See HORWITZ, supra note 9, at 72 (“The corporation, in short, was the most powerful and prominent
example of the emergence of non-individualistic, or if you will, collectivist legal institutions . . . . In all the Western
countries, therefore, the sudden focus on theories of corporate personality was associated with a crisis of legitimacy in
liberal individualism arising from the recent emergence of powerful collective institutions.”). See generally Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) 519 (1839); Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (1 How.) 497
(1844); Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (1 How.) 314 (1853); Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394
(1886); all discussed supra pp. 401-420.
154

155
For a visual illustration of this shift see John Gast’s artwork, American Progress (1872), available at
https://aras.org/sites/default/files/docs/00043AmericanProgress.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2014).
156

Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 61, discussed supra p. 412-416.
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transactions by which they had no possibility of accumulating the capital necessary to build
modern infrastructures. By 1906, it would extend this conclusion to the economy as a whole,
simply stating: “Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business activity, and their
aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all great enterprises.” 157
Thus we see a complex relationship between technology, organizations, and law
emerging in disputes about jurisdiction concerning railroad corporations. In this context,
jurisprudence can prove as plastic as technological shifts. The Supreme Court solved the problem
that railroads posed for jurisdiction by adopting the organizational consciousness that was
emerging in the United States during industrialism in place of its earlier narrative of self-sufficient
individualism. The Court determined that an incorporated organization was no longer something
“immaterial” or “intangible” per John Marshall’s conception, but an entity in its own right.158 This
response can be understood as part of what Professor Horwitz described as a broader cultural
effort to “express the reality of groups” in an increasingly populous, technological, and
organizational society in during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 159
II. HERE COMES TELEVISION
As Thomas Kuhn found in the case of scientific revolutions, a shock to the assumptions
on which an analytic paradigm is based will result in a paradigm shift to accommodate newly
discovered realities once enough new facts accumulate to make prior paradigmatic explanations
implausible.160 This section identifies an analogous shift in law, similar to the one we have just
seen concerning the railroads and jurisdiction. This shift responds to new realities for political
discourse posed by an era of technologically mediated communication and the organizations that
could afford to participate in it.
The emergence of mass media, and particularly television, undercut an assumption of the
Founding period that individuals and the expressly named “press” of the First Amendment would
function as the primary discursive units of the body politic. 161 This section reads a line of
Supreme Court cases that respond over a half-century to the emergence of television in political
discourse. These cases show how the Court came to believe that society had become dependent on
television to inform its viewpoints, recognized that primarily only organizations could afford to
produce mass technologically mediated speech under these conditions, and reflexively adapted the
legal paradigm for constitutional protection of political expression to include them. This is
analogous to its earlier adaptation of the paradigm for jurisdiction to accommodate corporations
based on the Court’s perception of their necessity for infrastructure development by rail.

157

Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).

158

Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 543.

HORWITZ, supra note 9 [1870-1960 volume], at 101 (describing “the most powerful of these early
efforts to express the reality of groups” as Ernst Freund’s The Legal Nature of Corporations (1897)); see also id., at 71
(discussing questions regarding “the reality of groups”).
159

160
See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (arguing that
scientific progress is not always a story of accumulation but rather of discovering anomalies and challenging old ways of
thinking).
161

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press.”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

ROBINSON_SHIFTED PERSONHOOD_FORMATTED_FINALFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

424

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

5/11/2016 10:03 AM

[Vol. 18.5

To historically associate the modern corporate form of ownership with the technological
development of mass communication, we must begin with the problem of the early industrial
producers. The development of continuous-process machinery in the 1880s exponentially
increased the speed and quantity of production in nearly every industry. 162 The absence of a
correlate culture of mass consumption, however, meant that producers’ problem was not one of
output, but of sales.163 The U.S. workforce was largely mass employed and wage-earning by the
early twentieth century, yet it needed an education in how to spend its newly discretionary income
on ready-made goods. It received this education from advertising. Radio, and later, television,
enabled sellers to reach consumers in their homes without ever having to send a salesman to
knock on their doors.164
Television’s uptake was particularly rapid. In 1945, there were seven thousand television
sets in U.S. homes, by 1952, twenty million sets, and before the close of the century, at least one
television in ninety-eight percent of homes and two or more in greater than half. 165 In comparison
to nineteenth-century mechanization, therefore, which made its primary impact on the workplace,
twentieth-century mass media was culturally much more impactful on the activities of
entertainment, leisure, and consumption at home.
For this reason, political persuaders quickly adopted television. 166 In 1952, Dwight
Eisenhower became the first presidential contender to air political advertisements on television.
New Yorker writer George Trow described the effect of Eisenhower’s unprecedented “electronic
campaign,” stating that “[t]he power shifted . . . from General Eisenhower to someone called Ike,
who embodied certain aspects of General Eisenhower and certain aspects of affection for General
Eisenhower.”167 Presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, who refused to appear on television to
“merchandise” himself “like breakfast cereal,” described it as “the ultimate indignity to the
democratic process.”168 Nonetheless, after being defeated by Eisenhower in 1952, Stevenson went
162

CHANDLER, supra note 41, at 289 (exploring the “most dramatic examples of mass production and mass

distribution”).
163

Id. at 335 (arguing that output sourcing became a challenge and citing an industry executive who stated
that, “[k]nowing that we had something that the consumer wanted, we had to advise the consumer of its existence. We did
this by extensive advertising.”).
164
Of the pioneers of early twentieth century industrial production and advertising, many maintain the
status of “household names” today, such as Heinz, Campbell, Ivory, and Pillsbury. Id. at 297, 335 (listing well-known
brands in the rise of public consumption of cigarettes, matches, flour, breakfast cereals, canned milk and soup).
165

The uptake of television has not slowed. In 1996, the eighteen-inch digital satellite dish became the most
sold electronic device in history after the VCR. History of Television, HISTORY OF FILM, TELEVISION, & VIDEO,
http://www.high-techproductions.com/historyoftelevision.htm (last visited Jun. 13, 2015).
166

See DAN NIMMO, THE POLITICAL PERSUADERS: THE TECHNIQUES OF MODERN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
137 (1970) (arguing that despite use of other forms of media, “it is television that distinguishes modern campaign
communication” from prior campaigns); See generally JAY G. BLUMLER & DENIS MCQUAIL, TELEVISION IN POLITICS: ITS
USES AND INFLUENCES (1968) (exploring the role of television in elections and political campaigns).
167

GEORGE TROW, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NO CONTEXT 46 (1981).

168
Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Presidential Candidate, Speech at the Democratic National Convention (Aug. 18,
1956). Stevenson’s “breakfast cereal” prediction was accurate. See Jeff Zeleney, The Up-Close-and-Personal Candidate?
A
Thing
of
the
Past,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
30,
2011,
at
A22,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/us/politics/presidential-candidates-make-fewer-in-person-appearances.html
(describing how recent political candidates have used “their campaigns as promotional tours for books, movies, and their
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on to produce television ads to challenge Eisenhower’s incumbency in 1956.169 Television
became mainstream in political campaigning.
The most significant change that television made in politics was to substantially increase
the cost of running for public office. As early as 1955, the premium rate for a network
advertisement was four thousand dollars per minute, 170 and by 1960, presidential contenders were
spending tens of millions of dollars on televised campaigning. 171 This figure nearly tripled before
the end of the decade, and by 2012, it was sixteen-fold after only three weeks of advertising
during the presidential contest.172
Certainly, money in politics was nothing new. The question for the second half of the
twentieth century was whether longstanding regulations of financial contributions and
expenditures could continue to control influence-peddling in politics in spite of new technologies
for mass communication.
A. Money in Politics is Not New; It’s Old
The concentration of wealth consequent upon the industrial expansion in the
post-Civil War era had profound implications for American life . . . .
[A]ggregated capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short
of corruption.173
Congress passed the first legislation regulating aggregated capital in politics in 1907,
when it made it unlawful for “any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in
connection with any election . . . .”174 This was a direct reaction to the concentration of wealth in
industrial corporations during the early twentieth century. In the 1921 case of Newberry v. United
States, for example, Truman Newberry was indicted for exceeding federal campaign expenditure
limits by ten-fold while competing against the automobile manufacturer Henry Ford in
Michigan’s 1918 Democratic Senate primary. 175 Newberry spent this sum hiring detectives to
investigate Ford, compensating obstructionist candidates to run against him, and bribing election
own personal brands”).
Larry J. Sabato, Help! I’m Drowning in TV
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/04/help-im-drowning-in-tv-ads106114_full.html?IEDc8EAw#.VKIEkM8EAw.
169

Ads!,

POLITICO

170

History of Television, supra note 165.

171

See id. (noting that presidential campaign advertising in 1968 was $27 million).

(Apr.

28,

2014),

172

See Wesleyan Media Project, 2012 Shatters 2004 and 2008 Records for Total Ads Aired (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/2012/10/24/2012-shatters-2004-and-2008-records-for-total-ads-aired/ (reporting the total
amount spent from October 1-21 by candidates, parties, and outside groups on presidential advertising in 2012 as
$164,575,210).
173

United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957).

174

Corporations were subject to fines of up to five thousand dollars, and corporate directors faced up to one
year in prison. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
175

See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 247-49, n.2 (1921) (explaining that Newberry willfully
violated election law by contributing and expending more money than lawfully allowed in a political campaign).
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officials and voters.176 At the same time, Ford also ran in the Republican primary, reducing the
general election to mere form if he were victorious in both. 177
The Supreme Court dismissed Newberry’s indictment yet expressed serious concern
about unregulated money in politics.178 That concern was central to Burroughs v. United States,
which involved a failure to report $58,000 in campaign contributions received during the 1928
contest for the Democratic presidential nomination.179 The Court described this corruption, if
recurrent, as “giv[ing] omen of danger” and stated that “the free use of money in elections, arising
from the vast growth of recent wealth . . . . present[ed] equal cause for anxiety.” 180 Congress, the
Court emphasized, bore a responsibility to preserve the purity of elections: “To say that Congress
is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper
use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of selfprotection.”181
The 1944 presidential election demonstrated that political influencers could circumvent
such safeguards by making expenditures on behalf of favored candidates and parties, instead of
making contributions directly to them.182 Congress prohibited such expenditures as “indirect
contributions” in 1947.183 The first challenge came in 1948 in United States v. Congress of
Industrial Organizations (“CIO”).184 The CIO, a labor union, was indicted for urging its members
to vote for a specified candidate for Congress on the front page of its weekly newsletter. 185 The
union argued that calling this newsletter an “indirect contribution” to the candidate infringed its
“rights of free speech, free press and free assemblage, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.” 186 The
176

Id. (listing the “purposes, objects and things” Newberry spent his money on).

177
Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that “[if Ford] had been successful as to both [primaries], the
subsequent election would have been reduced to the merest form”).

The majority found that the regulation of primary contests was not within Congress’s power. Id. at 258.
The dissenters, while acknowledging that primaries were unknown when the Constitution was framed, pointed out that
primaries had become the most determinative part of elections. See id. at 266-68 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 285 (Pitney,
J., concurring in part). This view prevailed by mid-century. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317 (1941)
(stating that primaries “are a step in the exercise by the people of their choice of representatives in Congress.”).
178

179

See Burroughs v. United States, 65 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1933).

180

Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934) (quoting The Ku Klux Cases, 110 U.S. 651, 666-

67 (1884)).
181

Id. at 545.

For a discussion of how the word “contribution” was interpreted in investigations of the 1944
presidential campaign, see United States v. Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 115 (1948).
182

183
See War Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connally Act), ch. 144, 57 Stat. 167 (1943) (limiting the amount of
money that can be contributed “in connection with any election”); Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act),
Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended within 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1947)). For a review of this history,
see Automobile Workers, 352 U.S at 577-79 (describing the historical antecedents to the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947).
184

See Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106.

185

Id. at 108 (urging all members of the CIO to vote for Judge Ed Garmatz, then a candidate for Congress
in Maryland at a special election to be held July 15, 1947).
186

Id. at 108-09.
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Supreme Court reasoned that, because there were no allegations of free distribution beyond union
membership, the endorsement was unlikely to persuade anyone who did not already voluntarily
affiliate with the union.187 Thus it found the CIO’s newsletter not to be an indirect contribution to
the candidate.188
Shortly thereafter, television came to occupy a central position in American life.
Regularly scheduled broadcasts began in New York in 1938 and became widespread after the
war.189 During the 1954 congressional elections, another union was indicted for making a
candidate endorsement by paying “a specific amount from its general treasury fund to Luckoff
and Wayburn Productions, Detroit, Michigan, to defray the costs of certain television broadcasts
sponsored by the Union from commercial television station WJBK.”190 On appeal in United States
v. International Union of United Automobile Workers (“UAW”), the Supreme Court compared
this activity to the political corruption cases of the earlier part of the century, stating that “what is
involved here is the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the
individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process. This case thus raises issues not
less than basic to a democratic society.” 191
Dissenting from that holding, Justice Douglas noted an inconsistency:
The opinion of the Court places [the televised UAW broadcast] in the setting of
corrupt practices. The opinion generates an environment of evildoing and points
to the oppressions and misdeeds that have haunted elections in this country.
Making a speech endorsing a candidate for office does not, however, deserve to
be identified with antisocial conduct. Until today political speech has never
been considered a crime.192
To explain why Automobile Workers belonged in the setting of corrupt practices, the
majority drew a distinction based on the technology used to disseminate the endorsement. Where
the CIO had “merely distributed its house organ to its own people,”193 the UAW had “used union
dues to sponsor commercial television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate to select
187
Id. at 111 (“We do not read the indictment as charging an expenditure by the CIO in circulating free
copies to nonsubscribers, nonpurchasers or among citizens not entitled to receive copies of ‘The CIO News,’ as members
of the union.”); but see id. at 131-32 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result) (calling into question whether the newsletter
was freely distributed).
188
Id. at 123-24. Despite using statutory construction to avoid the constitutional issue, the majority of the
Court nonetheless suggested, in dicta, that if the law were extended to publications like the CIO’s newsletter, “gravest
doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality.” Id. at 121. Five justices asserted that the indictment should be
dismissed directly on this basis. Id. at 124-26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 129-30 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the
result, joined by Black, Douglas, & Murphy, JJ.).
189

See Telecasts Here and Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1938, at 10 (providing the operating schedule for
a television station in New York).
190

United States v. UAW-CIO, 138 F. Supp. 53, 54 (E.D. Mich. 1956).

191

Automobile Workers, 352 U.S at 570.

192

Id. at 594 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

193

Id. at 589 (considering the decision of United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948)).
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certain candidates for Congress.”194 Though this distinction highlighted the reach of mass
media—the televised mass broadcast versus the printed in-house newsletter—the Court dismissed
it as “an irrelevant difference in the medium of communication employed.”195 This illustrates the
kind of “blackboxing” of reasoning about technology that we will see as the century goes on.
Presaging what would become the majority opinion in Citizens United, dissenting Justice
Douglas urged that all manner of speech are fungible in a marketplace of ideas, whether
technologically mediated or not:
It would make no difference under this construction of the [Corrupt Practices]
Act whether the union spokesman made his address from the platform of a hall,
used a sound truck in the streets, or bought time on radio or
television . . . . [T]he size of the audience has heretofore been deemed wholly
irrelevant to First Amendment issues. One has a right to freedom of speech
whether he talks to one person or to one thousand.196
Yet these comments overlook concerns about persuasive new forms of mass media that
began to emerge at end of the 1950s. In 1957, when Automobile Workers was decided, the
average U.S. viewer watched approximately two hundred minutes of television daily, a fact that
led then FCC chairman Newton Minow to declare television a “vast wasteland,” filled with
“endless hours of mediocrity.”197 In 1971, networks transitioned from sixty- to thirty-second
commercial segments, doubling the amount of advertising within programming and deepening
their involvement with corporate sponsors. During the 1970s, network profits surpassed $7.5
billion annually, while concern for public welfare relative to product sales led Congress to ban
televised cigarette advertising, and to obtain networks’ agreement to reduce commercial time in
children’s programming.198
B. You Can’t Afford to Speak? You Have a Right to Listen
Prior to the advent of cable, licensed television broadcasters were viewed as public

194

Id. at 585.

195

Id. (comparing the televised UAW broadcast to a radio advertisement by the Brotherhood of Railway
Trainmen and the printed newsletter distributed by the CIO); see also id. at 587 n.1 (quoting Senator Taft, sponsor of the
expenditures ban: “I want to make the point that we are not raising any new questions here. Those same questions could
have been raised with respect to corporations during the past 25 years. It is a question of fact: Was the corporation using
its money to influence a political election?”).
196
Id. at 594-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is . . . important—
vitally important—that all channels of communication be open . . . during every election . . . .”).
197

Newton N. Minow, Chairman, FCC, Television and the Public Interest, Address Before the National
Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/newtonminow.htm. Interestingly,
Minow worked on the electoral campaign staff of Adlai Stevenson, who was also deeply skeptical about the merits of
television. See Stevenson, supra note 160. Opinions varied, however; on the same day Minow made his “wasteland”
comment, Vice President Hubert Humphrey described television as “the greatest single achievement in communication
that anybody or any area of the world has ever known.” History of Television, supra note 165.
198

Id.
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trustees of a limited resource: the “airwaves.”199 Under this conception, Congress instituted the
Fairness Doctrine in 1949, mandating that broadcasters allocate “reasonable opportunity for the
discussion” of opposing viewpoints on public issues or risk revocation of their license to
broadcast.200
The Supreme Court upheld this regulation in Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal
Communication Commission, with three lines of reasoning tailored to television. First, it noted
that “there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate.”201 Then it described a “right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences,” and identified as a “purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.”202 In 1974, the Court struck down a statute substantially similar to the Fairness Doctrine
that required the provision of equal time in newspapers. 203 It clarified that because newspapers are
not “broadcast,” they do not raise the kind of technology-specific issues that legislatures have a
compelling interest to address concerning television. 204
Like the marketplace of ideas, the listeners’ “right to receive” also became more
prominent in the Supreme Court’s reasoning about the First Amendment as communications
technology spread. In 1943, the Court held that the First Amendment “necessarily protects the
right to receive” information.205 In 1969, it announced: “It is now well established that the
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.” 206 In 1976, it explained that “the
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.” 207
Both of these conceptual tools were necessary for shifting the legal paradigm governing
the constitutional protection of freedom of expression towards the inclusion of organizations.
Once discourse is viewed as having been transformed by technology into a matter of bandwidth to
which not everyone has access, producing a “marketplace of ideas” for those who must listen
becomes essential. This reasoning features prominently in the holding in Citizens United.208

199

See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 207, 213-17 (1982) (discussing the origins of the concept of broadcasters as community trustees).
200
The Fairness Doctrine was described at 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1983), removed by Broadcast Applications
and Proceedings, 76 Fed. Reg. 55,817 (Sept. 9, 2011). See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The
Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151 (1985); see also
HUGH CARTER DONAHUE, THE BATTLE TO CONTROL BROADCAST NEWS: WHO OWNS THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 45
(1989).
201

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).

202

Id. at 390 (emphasis added).

203

Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244, 258 (1974).

204

See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 200, at 156-57. In CBS v. FCC in 1981, the Court distinguished
Red Lion and Tornillo by explaining that Red Lion had to do with “broadcasting.” Id.
205

Martin, 319 U.S. at 143.

206

Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.

207

Va. Bd. Of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (“Austin interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by
the First Amendment.”) (citing N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)).
208
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Strikingly, this history of broadcast technology and its treatment in other sorts of cases (such as
Fairness Doctrine ones) has not yet been read alongside the history of campaign finance reform;
notably, it runs in parallel.
C. Money-as-Speech in the “Marketplace of Ideas”
The same year as networks transitioned from sixty to thirty-second advertising segments
(greatly increasing the amount of advertising on television, and the financial power of
broadcasters), Congress overhauled the campaign finance system with the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). 209 To create more transparency, it strengthened requirements for
disclosure of contributions and expenditures by campaigns, parties, and outside groups. 210 To
address the high costs of campaigning, it established a public fund for national party nominees
and presidential candidates who agreed to limit fundraising during the general election. 211
However, FECA failed to deter campaign finance abuses during the 1972 presidential
contest between Richard Nixon and George McGovern, in which some of the largest U.S.
corporations made illegal contributions. 212 Congress therefore amended the law in 1974 and
created a new regulatory agency, the Federal Election Commission, to enforce it. 213 These
amendments were challenged during the next presidential election. In a per curiam opinion of
considerable length in Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld FECA’s limits on campaign
contributions but struck its expenditure limits as unconstitutional. In doing so it accepted the
argument of Senator James Buckley, presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy, a number of
political parties, political action committees, and a political newspaper, that monetary
expenditures are at the very core of political speech, and that the Act’s limitations thus constitute
restraints on First Amendment liberty. 214
Buckley is a particularly significant placeholder in the shifting of the First Amendment
209

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (current version
at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (2002)).
210

52 U.S.C.A. § 30120(a)(3), (d)(2) (originally enacted as FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 318) (requiring televised
electioneering communications funded by anyone other than a candidate to include a disclaimer identifying the person or
entity responsible for the content of the advertising); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29. The disclaimer requirement is the only piece of
McCain-Feingold’s regulation of electioneering communication that survived Citizens United.
See Presidential Election Campaign Fund (PECF), FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.shtml (last visited Jun. 13, 2015); Party nominees can access a public fund gathered
from taxpayer contributions if they raise a minimum of $5,000 from individual donors in at least twenty states and agree to
overall spending limits of $10 million plus an indexed inflation offset (in 2012, the limit was approximately $45 million).
Id. Presidential candidates are eligible for $20 million in public funding if they agree to cease fundraising during the
general election. Id.; see generally COSTAS PANAGOPOULOS, PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2011)
(discussing current issues in campaign finance practices).
211

212
Ben A. Franklin, Inquiries Into Nixon’s Re-election Funds Turning Up a Pattern of High Pressure, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 1973, at L35 (noting conviction of American Airlines for making illegal contributions to Nixon’s
campaign); The Nation: Corporations Had a Lot to Spend on Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1975, at E4 (eighteen
corporations in total were convicted of violating the law).
213
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C.A § 30106).
214

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15, 19, 45.
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paradigm to accommodate organizations, because it links reasoning about aggregated capital to
the changes brought to communication by technologies of mass media. The Court therefore
rejected the argument “that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money
operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the
First Amendment,” and did so explicitly on grounds that using expensive technology had become
an inevitable aspect of speaking to vast populations in a modern age:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the
expenditure of money . . . . The electorate’s increasing dependence on
television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made
these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective
political speech.215
Here again we see a technological imperative driving jurisprudence. The statement that
“virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure
of money” suggests that high-cost political speech must be accepted because technology has
irreversibly modified the way we receive information. Thus the Court quipped in Buckley that
“[b]eing free to engage in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is
like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of
gasoline.”216 Yet this underplays precisely the problem that Congress sought to address with
FECA: that most people could not afford to “debate on public issues” at a cost of four thousand
dollars per minute.217 Rather than allowing technology to simply ratchet up the cost of running for
public office, Congress decided to publicly finance the presidential election and to limit
expenditures in an attempt to diminish the importance of material wealth as a prerequisite to
effective campaigning. Here we see two different views of technology—one legislative, one
judicial—driving two different interpretations of whether governmental action is required vis-àvis capital expenditures, made mostly by corporations, in a high-cost environment for political
communication.
Finding instead that “restricting the voices of people and interest groups who have
money to spend” impedes constitutionally protected expressive rights, Buckley equated the
expenditure of money to speech.218 Thus, the Court reframed FECA as Congress’ choice of a
redistributive versus laissez faire policy for political expression, describing its expenditure
restrictions as attempting to equalize people and groups of different ex ante “financial ability to
engage in public discussion”219 by “placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression” ex

215

Id. at 16, 19 (footnote omitted).

216

Id. at 19 n.18.

217

Id. at 14 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).

218

Id. at 17, 19.

219

Id. at 49.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

ROBINSON_SHIFTED PERSONHOOD_FORMATTED_FINALFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

432

5/11/2016 10:03 AM

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 18.5

post.220 Citizens United would adopt precisely this same framing, relying on Buckley to cast
McCain-Feingold’s regulation of corporate and union “electioneering communication” as simply
a regulation of the capital required to produce it.221
After Buckley eliminated restrictions on their expenditures, outside groups increasingly
functioned as the media arm of campaigns and parties, still subject to FECA’s contribution limits,
during the 1980s.222 In 1984, an organization called the National Conservative Political Action
Committee (“NCPAC”) produced a widely viewed advertisement called “Morning in America,”
extolling the incumbent Reagan’s contributions to U.S. prosperity and strength during the
Reagan-Mondale presidential contest.223 The Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) charged
that NCPAC had expended money on this ad as candidate advocacy, in violation of the public
financing scheme established by FECA, which made it a criminal offense to spend more than
$1,000 to further the election of a candidate who had already chosen to receive public
financing.224 Relying on Buckley, the Supreme Court affirmed in Federal Election Commission v.
NCPAC that outside group expenditures “produce speech at the core of the First Amendment.” 225
As long NCPAC’s expenditures on “Morning in America” were “uncoordinated with the
candidate or his campaign,” the Court found “no tendency” for corruption or the appearance of
corruption, which were the “only legitimate and compelling interests thus far identified for
restricting campaign finances.”226
NCPAC is significant because, as Buckley had collapsed the distinction between money
and speech, it collapsed the difference between speakers and listeners. It did this by reading
together the constitutional concept of freedom of association with the concept of freedom of
expression. The Court described PACs as “mechanisms” by which “large numbers of individuals
of modest means can join together in organizations that serve to ‘amplif[y] the voice of their
adherents.’”227 However, as the dissent pointed out, the donation of money does not transform
contributors into speakers; it transforms the recipient organization into one. 228 NCPAC’s majority
220

Id. at 17.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350 (2010) (“Buckley rejected the premise that the Government has an
interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.’”) (quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48).
221

222

See KENNETH M. GOLDSTEIN, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING, AND PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 24, 125

(1999).
Ronald
Reagan
It’s
Morning
In
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fa8Qupc4PnQ (last visited Jun. 13, 2015).
223

America

1984,

YOUTUBE,

FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 482-83 (1985) [hereinafter NCPAC].
The Democratic National Committee’s standing to make a claim against NCPAC on that basis was disputed, however the
Federal Election Commission, a regulator clearly empowered by Congress to enforce the statute, joined the suit. Id. at 48990.
224

225

NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493.

226

Id. at 496-97; but see id. at 511 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J. & Brennan, J.) (noting a
pattern of “significant contacts between an organization like NCPAC and candidates for, and holders of, public office,”
including the exchange of personnel).
227

Id. at 494 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22).

228

Id. at 512-13 (White, J., dissenting)
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equivocated by reasoning that individual “contributors obviously like the message they are
hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to that message; otherwise they
would not part with their money.”229 Yet contributors have no control over a PAC’s messaging; if
they do not like what they hear, they have no recourse other than to withhold funding for its future
speech.
Despite this hazy logic, NCPAC’s “associational” theory of political speech was a logical
outgrowth of Buckley’s recognition that television and other mass media had made the
expenditure of large sums of money an “essential ingredient” of contemporary political
advocacy.230 The next step was to note that, in a “marketplace of ideas” mediated through
expensive technologies, individuals were no longer the primary discursive units of the body
politic because they could not afford to be. NCPAC noted exactly this: “The PACs in this case, of
course, are not lone pamphleteers or street corner orators in the Tom Paine mold; they spend
substantial amounts of money in order to communicate their political ideas through sophisticated
media advertisements.”231
In 1986, the Supreme Court made a clearer articulation of the premise behind its ruling
in NCPAC by describing listener contributions as a “market signal” of support for the
organization’s ideas.232 It therefore seemed to reach the same conclusion about contemporary
public discourse as media theorist Tarleton Gillespie: “The means by which we produce,
circulate, and consume information in a complex society must necessarily be handled through the
division of labor: some produce and select information, and the rest of us, at least in that moment,
can only take it for what it’s worth.” 233 We can see in this comment the relevance of all of the key
concepts that the Supreme Court developed to accommodate technologically-mediated mass
communication within its First Amendment jurisprudence during the second half of the twentieth
century: particularly, the listener’s right to receive information in a marketplace of ideas
(“consume information”), and the right of organizations to spend unlimited amounts to produce
that marketplace (“circulate information”). Under this rubric, consumption of a PACs’ ideas by
The majority never explicitly identifies whose First Amendment interests it believes it is protecting.
However, its concern for rights of association and the effective political speech of those of modest
means . . . indicates that it is concerned with the interests of the PACs’ contributors. But the
‘contributors’ are exactly that—contributors, rather than speakers . . . . Even if spending money is to
be considered speech, I fail to see how giving money to an independent organization to use as it
wishes is also speech . . . . [A]ppellees are not simply mouthpieces for their individual contributors.
Id.
229
Id. at 495. Professor Batchis points to the same equivocation in Citizens United. Wayne Batchis,
Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From Freedom of Association to Freedom of the Association, 36
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 8-9 (2012).

Further, as a more academic and historical then doctrinal matter, it is worth noting that NCPAC’s link
between freedom of association and freedom of speech expresses a version of “group theory” of the kind that legal
thinkers in the United States and Europe were struggling to develop during the later nineteenth century. See HORWITZ,
supra note 9, at 185.
230

231

NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 493.

232

FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986).

233

Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON
COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 191 (Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J. Boczkowski, & Kirsten A. Foot, eds.,
2014).
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contributing money to it serves as a “market signal” of support that becomes the twentieth-century
constitutional equivalent to speaking itself.
Consequently, by the late 1970s the Supreme Court had determined that high-cost,
technologically-mediated mass media constituted a new normal with which the First Amendment
must catch up or, as it said per curiam in Buckley, risk “reduc[ing] the quantity of
expression . . . the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached.”234 The Court concurrently portrayed these circumstances as non-novel,
because “[t]he distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet” also entails costs.235 Thus the Court
elided an assertion that technology was constitutionally neutral and an assertion that it was a
maximizing factor in democratic discourse, measured quantitatively. Importantly, this allowed the
Court to be both technologically deterministic in its reasoning—”we must adapt the First
Amendment to mass media because it has already changed public discourse”—and
technologically optimistic—”in any case, it’s a good thing and not unlike anything that has come
before.” We will see these typologies again in Citizens United.
III. ANTIDISTORTION MEETS THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE
After Buckley, influential television ads produced by outside organizations continued to
figure prominently in U.S. elections during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1988, an ad known as “Willie
Horton” juxtaposed the image of a convicted felon with that of the Democratic presidential
nominee Michael Dukakis, above the text “Kidnapping, Stabbing, Raping.” 236 The ad was
produced by a Republican organization known as the National Security PAC to associate
Dukakis’ governorship in Massachusetts with the story of Horton, who committed the listed
crimes while granted weekend furlough from a life sentence in the state. During the 1990s,
outside organizations spent heavily on behalf of the Democrats; labor unions, for example, spent
$2.7 million on media communication in support of Bill Clinton during his 1996 presidential race
against Bob Dole.237
The next overhaul of electoral regulation was clearly the product of weariness on the part
of both parties with these “ad wars.” In debate over the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,
legislators described the ads as “poison politics,” “air pollution,” “drive by shootings,” “crack
cocaine,” “brutal,” and “a nightmare.”238 Sponsored by Democrat Russ Feingold and Republican

234

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.

235

Id.

236

Llehman84,
Willie
Horton
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io9KMSSEZ0Y.

1988

Attack

Ad,

YOUTUBE

(Nov.

3,

2008)

237

See David E. Rosenbaum, In Political Money Game, the Year of Big Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1996, at A1; Anthony Corrado, Financing the 1996 Presidential General Election, in FINANCING THE 1996 ELECTION 63,
83 (John C. Green ed., 1999).
144 Cong. Rec. 1601 (1998) (statement of Sen. Daschle) (analogizing attack ads to “crack cocaine”); id.
at 1613 (statement of Sen. Durbin) (describing them as “drive by shooting[s]”); 145 Cong. Rec. 20505 (1997) (statement
of Sen. Dorgan) (describing them as “air pollution”); id. at 2051-52 (statement of Sen. McCain) (describing “how to raise
the tenor of the debate in our elections and give people real choices”); 145 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (statement of Sen.
Boxer) (“They directly attack candidates without any accountability. It is brutal . . . . We have an opportunity in the
McCain-Feingold bill to stop that . . . .”); 145 Cong. Rec. S12606-S12607 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone) (“I think these issue advocacy ads are a nightmare. I think all of us should hate them . . . . [By passing the
238
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John McCain, the new law aimed directly at minimizing the ads by barring corporate and unionfunded “electioneering communication” distributed by broadcast, cable, or satellite transmissions
that could be received by 50,000 or more persons during periods shortly before primary and
general elections.239
A. One of these Things is not Like the Others: Austin, McConnell, and Citizens United
A year after it was enacted, McCain-Feingold was challenged in McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission.240 In a 5-4 decision announced in an opinion of over one hundred pages, the
Supreme Court upheld the law as furthering the government’s interest in counteracting the
“‘corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth . . . accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.’” 241 McConnell’s majority cited a legislative record of $135 to $150
million in spending by outside organizations on televised “issue” advertisements during the 1996
electoral cycle, followed by $270 to $340 million during the mid-term election of 1998, and
exceeding $500 million during the presidential election of 2000, which featured over one
thousand different issue advertisements.242 The Court noted that “[c]orporations and unions spent
hundreds of millions of dollars of their general funds” to produce these ads, which were
“specifically intended to affect election results . . . confirmed by the fact that almost all of them
aired in the 60 days immediately preceding a federal election.” 243
Congress, the Court found, was not only concerned by the close nexus between
corporations and unions and political parties and candidates, but by the power of television to
effectively mask those connections. McConnell’s majority cited a legislative record indicating that
candidates had been able “to work closely with friendly interest groups to sponsor so-called issue
ads when the candidates themselves were running out of money,” while using “misleading names
to conceal their identity.”244 Citizens for Better Medicare, for example, was “not a grassroots
organization of citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a platform for an association
of drug manufacturers.”245
Both the majority and dissenting justices in McConnell therefore identified the public
policy issue addressed by McCain-Feingold as a technology management question. The law did
legislation, we] could get some of this poison politics off television”); 148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Cantwell) (“This bill is about slowing the ad war . . . and making sure the flow of negative ads by
outside interest groups does not continue to permeate the airwaves.”).
239

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA, McCain-Feingold Act), Pub L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 432); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(1)(2), (b)(3)(ii) (2009).
240

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S..

241

Id. at 274-75 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).

242

Id. at 127 n.20.

243

Id. at 127.

244

Id. at 128.

245

Id. For more recent examples, see Fredreka Schouten, Christopher Schnarrs & Gregory Korte, Naming
names
behind
slew
of
super
PAC
ads,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
1,
2012,
10:03
AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-01-31/super-pacs-campaign-finance-reports/52907890/1.
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“not apply to advertising in the print media or on the Internet,” the majority pointed out, but to the
“virtual torrent of televised election-related ads during the periods immediately preceding federal
elections.”246 Justice Scalia, dissenting, also referred to the legislative record: “[L]et us not be
deceived. While the Government’s briefs and arguments before this court focused on the horrible
‘appearance of corruption,’ the most passionate floor statements during the debates on this
legislation pertained to so-called attack ads . . . .”247
McConnell identified the governmental interests advanced McCain-Feingold’s regulation
of mass-broadcast “electioneering communication” as both an interest in “anticorruption” and an
interest in “antidistortion.”248 The latter was introduced by the 1990 case of Michigan Chamber of
Commerce v. Austin.249 Austin upheld the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which, similar to
FECA, prohibited corporations from using their general treasury funds to make independent
expenditures on behalf of candidates for state office. 250 Michigan argued that corporations receive
“special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the
accumulation and distribution of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital” and “present
the potential for distorting the political process,” because the capital accumulation has “little or no
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 251 The Supreme Court
found Michigan’s interest in preventing this “distortion” sufficiently different from the interest in
preventing corruption that it found inadequate to justify a similar ban on expenditures in
Buckley.252 McConnell’s majority extended this reasoning to McCain-Feingold’s regulation of
corporate- and union-funded mass-broadcast “electioneering communication.” 253
Both Austin and McConnell were challenged when a nonprofit organization called
“Citizens United” sought to release what it described as a “documentary film” critical of
candidate Hillary Clinton on cable television within thirty days of the Democratic primary for the
presidential election.254 The organization preemptively challenged McCain-Feingold’s prohibited
period for “electioneering communication” as abridging its right to freedom of speech protected
by the First Amendment.255 In yet another 5-4 decision of considerable length in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court determined that the film was indeed an
“electioneering communication” on the basis of its thesis that Senator Clinton was unfit for the
presidency, but found regulation of such communication to violate the free speech protections of

246

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207.

247

Id. at 260 (Stevens, J., concurring).

248

Id. at 136, 167-70, 205 (discussing the “distorting effect” of ads).

249

Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).

250

Id. at 654.

251

Id. at 658-59, 661-62.

Id. at 659-60, 666 (describing “the State’s decision to regulate only corporations [as] precisely tailored
to serve the compelling state interest of eliminating from the political process the corrosive effect of political ‘war chests’
amassed with the aid of the legal advantages given to corporations.”).
252

253

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (citing Austin, 494 U.S. 652 at 660).

254

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310, 319.

255

Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
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the First Amendment.256 Reversing both McConnell and Austin, the majority relied on Buckley,
quoting from that case to describe McCain-Feingold as “necessarily reduc[ing] the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the
size of the audience reached.”257 The law therefore harmed “society as a whole, which is deprived
of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”258
As we have seen, the “marketplace of ideas” migrated from the dissenting periphery to
the majority center of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment’s core values,
parallel to the rise of television in American life. 259 Conceptually, it made room within the
amendment for valuing not only freedoms of speech and of the press, but for preserving a wide
spectrum of ideas for listeners to hear, and for viewing listeners’ financial contributions to
organizations as equivalent to the exercise of either freedom of speech (Buckley) or freedom of
speech-qua-association (NCPAC). This allowed the Court to accommodate within its traditional
First Amendment protection a political conversation dominated by expensive mass media, in
which most individuals could not afford to participate as anything other than listeners. Using
these concepts, Citizens United reframed the political “ad war” as a phenomenon not only
beneficial but necessary to create a “marketplace of ideas” in contemporary American politics.
This view replaced an extensive legislative history, barely mentioned in Citizens United, in which
Congress found televised ads distortive of American politics. 260
Under its optimistic view of television, Citizens United’s majority would characterize
McCain-Feingold’s regulation of corporate and union-funded mass broadcast electioneering
communication as “analogous to licensing laws implemented in 16th- and 17th-century England,”
and permitting the FEC to do nothing less than “use censorship to control thought.” 261 “[T]he
most important means of mass communication in modern times,” the majority asserted in Citizens
United, to the contrary carried a constitutional imperative: “The First Amendment was certainly
not understood to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media.” 262
The Court’s obligation, like Congress’, was to step aside: “We must decline to draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines based on the particular media or technology used to disseminate
256

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 324, 368.

257

Id. at 339 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19).

258

Id. at 335 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).

Compare Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating “the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market”), with Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (asserting “the purpose of the First Amendment [is] to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail”), Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at
257 (noting “the wisdom of Justice Holmes’ observation that the ‘ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas’”), and Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (declaring “Austin interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected
by the First Amendment.”).
259

Compare McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127 (quoting extensively legislators’ negative remarks about televised
ads), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353 (describing television as “society’s most salient media” and one of “the most
important means of communication in modern times”).
260

261

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335, 356 (describing McCain-Feingold as requiring corporations and unions
to “ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak”).
Id. at 353 (stating “television networks and major newspapers owned by media corporations have
become the most important means of mass communication in modern times.”).
262
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political speech from a particular speaker.” 263 This was because “[r]apid changes in technology—
and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against upholding a
law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.” 264
This kind of reasoning suggests that the “concept of free expression” and “rapid changes
in technology” are borne from the same source: from a “creative dynamic” inherent in the First
Amendment. Yet it is the Court’s own technologically-optimistic interpretation of these
technologies as facilitating citizens’ “freedom to experiment and create in the realm of thought
and speech,” that is driving this conclusion. 265 As in Buckley, the logic is technologically
deterministic: it allows what is technologically possible to draw the line for what is
constitutionally permissible. Congress cannot impose a quiet period prior to elections on
“electioneering communications” funded by corporations and unions because “society as a
whole” will be “deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” 266 This calibrates the
protections of the First Amendment to judges’ normative assessment of a society they perceive to
be reliant on technology to generate political discourse. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent in
Citizens United, this generates a technological change-driven jurisprudence “in which novel First
Amendment standards must be devised on an ad hoc basis . . . .”267
Thus we can view Citizens United as a kind of Lochner for the Information Age: it
exhibits the same kind of hubris regarding legislative management of technologies of mass
communication that Lochner exhibited regarding legislative management of the economy. 268 Its
majority portrayed McCain-Feingold’s regulation of the “ad wars” as heavy-handed Luddism
against a creative and technologically adept citizenry. This view depends on overlooking an
imbalance in power between organizations and individuals in a mass media-dominated
“marketplace of ideas,” just as Lochner depended heavily on optimistic views of laissez faire
capitalism that overlook a similar power imbalance in the labor market. 269
Like Lochner’s majority, Citizens United’s majority portrayed Congress’ regulation of
“electioneering communication” as an attempt to reorder economic relationships already justly
263

Id. at 326.

264

Id. at 364.

265

Id. at 372 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 341) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id.
(“Citizens must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for the expression of ideas.”) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at
341) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
266

Id. at 335 (quoting Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

267

Id. at 400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

268

This idea owes its provenance to Professor David Super, who commented about the similarity of my
argument to Justice Holmes’ dissent in Lochner during a summer faculty colloquium at Georgetown University Law
Center, where I presented early versions of this work consequent to a visiting researcher affiliation during 2012-13. For
that I would like to thank Gregory Klass, Julie O’Sullivan, and Dr. Eric L. Motley.
269
See EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
MASS MEDIA 2 (1988) (describing “huge inequality in command of resources, and its effect . . . on access to a
private media system”); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (reasoning “[t]his case is decided upon an
economic theory which a large part of this country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that
theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody
their opinions in law.”).

OF THE
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determined by the flow of capital. However, this portrayal was only possible because its reliance
on Buckley allowed it to misconstrue McCain-Feingold as equivalent to a direct regulation of
expenditures, and therefore failed to properly distinguish Austin and McConnell. Yet one of these
things is not like the others: McCain-Feingold’s ban applied only to corporations and unions using
their general treasuries to make “electioneering communication” with the ability to reach fifty
thousand people or more during periods proximate to elections; Austin involved a regulation of
expenditures, comparable to FECA, sustained based on arguments about the distortive effects on
elections of corporate “war chests.” McConnell, in contrast, upheld McCain-Feingold as a
regulation “of . . . expression,” citing a legislative record heavily focused on televised ads and
correctly identifying the law as a regulation of the technological means of expression, not only the
capital used to access it.270
Failing to analytically distinguish Austin and McConnell based on the object of their
regulations explains why government lawyers ultimately abandoned arguments based on
“antidistortion” in Citizens United.271 Once it was clear that the Court would rely on Buckley,
then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan disclaimed any reliance on antidistortion in relation to Austin,
and did not distinguish McConnell on the basis that it concerned a regulation of technologies of
mass broadcast “electioneering communication.” 272 This was a missed opportunity to extend the
“antidistortion interest” to McCain-Feingold, whose legislative history so clearly showed
Congress’ concern with “distortion” of the electoral process by the “ad wars” produced by
technologies of mass media and those who could afford to use them. 273
“Shifted personhood” is the new paradigm for freedom of expression because Citizens
United rested its ultimate conclusion not on the many statements the Court made about mass
media, but on a statement about the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s
identity.274 The majority described McCain-Feingold as a “categorical distinction[] based on the
corporate identity of the speaker” that targeted “certain disfavored associations of citizens—those
that have taken on the corporate form.” 275 It recast the entire jurisprudential history of legislative
attempts to reform the electoral system within this frame as simply “conflicting lines of precedent:
a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate
identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”276 Framed thusly, the law was easy to strike
270

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204.

271

For an explanation not related to technology see generally Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the
Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989 (2010).
272
Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-48, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205) (asserting “where we
talk about the distortion of the electoral process that occurs when corporations use their shareholders’ money who may or
may not agree . . . [w]e do not rely at all on Austin to the extent that anybody takes Austin to be suggesting anything about
the equalization of a speech market.”).
273

See 144 Cong. Rec. 1601 (1998).

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346 (“[T]he Government cannot restrict political speech based on the
speaker’s corporate identity.”), (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765). Bellotti struck down a Massachusetts law prohibiting
corporations from spending money to advocate during referenda on public questions that did not concern the corporation’s
property, business, or assets. See generally Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). McConnell distinguished the regulation at issue
in Bellotti from McCain-Feingold’s regulation of “electioneering communications.” See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 n.88.
274

275

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364, 356.

276

Id. at 348.
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down:
If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or
jailing citizens . . . for simply engaging in political speech. If the antidistortion
rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban
political speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken on
the corporate form.277
This placed the Court’s reasoning, including its reasoning about technology, squarely
within the frame of a traditionally understood justification for the Court’s existence as a
countermajoritarian institution: to protect unpopular political minorities. 278 Incorporation here
appears as simply a phase change of one kind of entity, “citizen,” into an organizational form
better suited to doing things in a modern society—for example, one needs to use the mass media
to communicate to the mass public. While this significantly downplays the resources involved in
taking on the corporate form, and the real differences between organizations and actual members
of the body politic, it reflects the strong position that organizations have already obtained in
society at large within First Amendment jurisprudence.
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Virginia Pharmacy
The majority’s comments in Citizens United about television as society’s “most salient
media” highlight the significance of technological optimism concerning mass media in the case
decision. As this section will explore, we can provisionally associate this optimism with the death
of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 2005. This connection helps explain the Court’s abrupt about-face
concerning the constitutionality of McCain-Feingold in the short span between McConnell in
2003 and Citizens United in 2010. While verifying this conclusion requires deeper treatment of
First Amendment jurisprudence than there is space for here, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 1976
dissent in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel will suffice.279
The Virginia Pharmacy dissent suggests Justice Rehnquist’s deep skepticism regarding
technologies of mass media.280 Decided the same year as Buckley v. Valeo, the Court in Virginia
Pharmacy struck down a state law that sanctioned pharmacists for unprofessional conduct if they
advertised prices directly to consumers.281 Dissenting from the holding, the Chief Justice was the

277
Id. at 349; see also id. at 392 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] corporation . . . cannot be denied the right to
speak on the simplistic ground that it is not ‘an individual American.’”).
278

See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16-33 (2d. ed. 1986); but see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 158 (2002) (“[I]t is in this disjuncture between public
opinion and academic concern that we can see the countermajoritarian problem for what it is—an obsession that grips the
academy even when it fails to describe reality.”).
279

Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

See id. I am certainly not the first to note Chief Justice Rehnquist’s significant divergence from the other
conservative members of the Court regarding corporate free speech. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free
Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 253, 254 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
280

281

Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
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only member of the Court to mention television. 282 He described its potentially distortive effects
on patients’ perception of complex issues related to medication, and argued that “[t]he very real
dangers that general advertising for such drugs might create in terms of encouraging, even though
not sanctioning, illicit use of them by individuals for whom they have not been prescribed . . . are
simply not dealt with in the Court’s opinion.” 283 He likened a pharmaceutical price regulation to
legislative regulation of liquor and cigarette advertising already found constitutional: “Nothing we
know about the acquisitive instincts of those who inhabit every business and profession . . . gives
any reason to think that such persons will not do everything they can to generate demand for these
products in much the same manner and to much the same degree as demand for other
commodities has been generated.”284
We can see from these comments how Chief Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation of the
constitutional scope of protection for freedom of expression was in at least one instance
underwritten by his skepticism about the technology of television and about the “acquisitive
instincts” of organizations.285 His concerns, in fact, are strikingly similar to those that led
Congress to enact McCain-Feingold, whose regulation of corporate and union “electioneering
communication” Justice Rehnquist would vote to uphold in McConnell.286 Like Congress in that
piece of legislation, Justice Rehnquist distinguished in Virginia Pharmacy between different types
of communication, noting that “the challenged statute does not prohibit anyone from receiving . . .
information [about pharmaceutical prices] either in person or by phone.” 287
282

Id. at 789 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

283

Id. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist gave examples of the kind of advertisements he
predicted the holding would generate:
“Pain getting you down? Insist that your physician prescribe Demerol. You pay a little more than
for aspirin, but you get a lot more relief.”
“Can’t shake the flu? Get a prescription for Tetracycline from your doctor today.”
“Don’t spend another sleepless night. Ask your doctor to prescribe Seconal without delay.” Id. at
788.

Id. at 788 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Pharmaceutical companies have aired advertisements that are strikingly similar to those predicted above.
See,
e.g.,
Zoloft,
Original
Zoloft
Commercial,
YOUTUBE
(Mar.
12,
2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=twhvtzd6gXA (last visited Jun. 13, 2015).
Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 789 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For an example of the Court’s jurisprudence
surrounding regulation of liquor advertising, see, e.g., Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
284

Id. at 789. We can perhaps better understand Justice Rehnquist’s skepticism about pharmaceutical
advertising given the posthumous revelation that he was addicted to a prescription sleeping aid. See Pete Yost, Rehnquist
Drug
Dependency
Detailed,
WASH.
POST,
(Jan.
5,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/01/05/AR2007010500521.html.
285

286

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S.
310 (overruling portions of McCain-Feingold except for those concerning the regulation of “electioneering
communication”).
287
Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 782 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing the pharmaceutical consumer’s
“right to receive information” in the context of standing, and noting that not all avenues to receive information had been
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There was little change in the ideological orientation of the justices who came to replace
their predecessors during the period between McConnell and Citizens United; however, after
Chief Justice Rehnquist died between the two decisions, John Roberts replaced him at fifty years
old, having lived his entire life in the era of television. 288 Chief Justice Roberts joined with the
majority in Citizens United, finding McCain-Feingold unconstitutional under the optimistic view
of television that Justice Kennedy articulated in the majority opinion.
C. Deepening the Antidistortion Interest
[W]here is it written that someone who is good on television is necessarily also
a good politician?
Václav Havel, Former President of Czechoslovakia 289
Between Automobile Workers and Citizens United, the Supreme Court grounded its
increasingly permissive approach to the involvement of non-party organizations in U.S. politics in
a technologically optimistic theory about the ability of such organizations to make the most
effective use of modern communications technologies to generate a “marketplace of ideas.” 290
The Court suggested that, without organizational speech, public debate would stall, and it
predicted that other emergent forms of communication, such as web-based social media, would
eventually allow individuals to compete with organizational speakers. 291 Relying on these points
of view, the Court rejected concerns voiced by the people’s elected representatives in Congress
about the distortive effects of specific kinds of mass media and specific kinds of organizations on
the democratic process.292
The “antidistortion interest” that was abandoned in Citizens United can be deepened by
using social theory to gain a richer understanding of the interactions between the material,
informational, and subjective inputs that influence voters during elections. This is a novel but not
unprecedented approach to legal scholarship. 293 It refers to a body of knowledge overlooked by
foreclosed).
288

In 2005, John Roberts (in the majority in Citizens United majority) was appointed by George H.W. Bush
to replace William Rehnquist (in the McConnell majority regarding McCain-Feingold Title II); in 2006, Samuel Alito (in
the majority in Citizens United majority) was appointed by George H.W. Bush to replace Sandra Day O’Connor (in the
majority in McConnell); in 2009, Sonia Sotomayor (in the dissent in Citizens United) was appointed by President Barack
Obama to replace David Souter (in the majority in McConnell). See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 110, Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 316. Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy were in the dissent in McConnell regarding Title II of McCain-Feingold,
maintaining that opinion in the majority in Citizens United. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 110-11; Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 316.
289
Vaclav Havel, Former President of Czechoslovakia, Commencement Address at Harvard University
(May 12, 1995) (transcript available at http://www.humanity.org/voices/commencements/vaclav-havel-harvard-universityspeech-1995).
290

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335.

Id. at 364 (“Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web
sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues.”).
291

292

See id. at 349-60.

293

See generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (Univ. of Chi.
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the Supreme Court as it crafted its own theory about the interaction between mass media and
democratic discourse, one heavily leavened with technological optimism and technological
determinism, and then ascribed that theory to the Constitution itself.
The primary way we differ from the organizations we create can be labeled “psyche,”
“self,” and “soul,” depending on the discourse. Here, I use the term “consciousness,” following
philosopher Daniel N. Robinson and Nobel Prize-winning neurophysiologist Sir John C. Eccles,
who found consciousness to be personhood’s most distinctive trait. 294 Consciousness remains a
scientific mystery, and to animate it in artificial intelligence is one of the great projects of our
time.295 The philosopher René Descartes reasoned that consciousness constitutes more than the
physical mechanics that take place in the brain, and contemporary scientists continue to make this
assertion.296 Anesthesiologists can significantly alter consciousness but cannot explain the
mechanism by which brain physiology produces it. 297 Evolutionary biologists cannot explain its
existence without a discrete physical aspect that could have been subject to selective evolution. 298
The American social compact was formed to protect “life, liberty, and property,” 299
which have material qualities, yet are qualitatively more when possessed in the context of
conscious self-awareness. As Justice Brandeis articulated in Olmstead v. United States:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. 300
Thus the Supreme Court has found that the First Amendment protects speech irrespective
of whether it has material worth as truthful information, because it seeks to promote a society that
has self-expressive individuals, regardless of the merit of what they articulate. 301 Similarly, the
Court has found that the Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful searches and seizures
because to invade privacy has not only material consequences, but is also an affront to what
Press 2001) (using philosophy, anthropology, linguistics, and literary theory to understand how legal actors reason and
decide).
294

SIR JOHN ECCLES & DANIEL N. ROBINSON, THE WONDER OF BEING HUMAN: OUR BRAIN & OUR MIND

25-26 (1984).
295
See, e.g., A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433 (1950) (asking the
rhetorical question of whether machines can think).
296

See, e.g., S. Zeki, The Disunity of Consciousness, 7 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 214 (2003).

297
Stuart R. Hameroff, The Entwined Mysteries of Anesthesia and Consciousness, 105 ANESTHESIOLOGY
400 (2006) (“Unlike other receptor-mediated pharmacologic targets, consciousness is ill-defined, [and] cannot be
measured . . . .”).
298

Alexander Marshack, Some Implications of the Paleolithic Symbolic Evidence for the Origin of
Language, 280 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 289, 310 (1976).
299

U.S. CONST. pmbl. (1787).

300

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

301

But see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (recognizing there is no absolute
protection for factual communications that cause private injury).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

ROBINSON_SHIFTED PERSONHOOD_FORMATTED_FINALFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

444

5/11/2016 10:03 AM

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 18.5

Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis referred to as the “inviolability of personality.” 302 Thus, it is
not only because of the material harm done to women’s bodily autonomy posed by restrictions on
contraception that they are unconstitutional, but also because of the subjective harm done to
women’s sense of privacy over reproductive decision-making.303
To further the idea that human consciousness is central to systems of law, we can use
philosopher Karl R. Popper’s description of three worlds of human experience. 304 Popper
distinguishes three worlds: (I) a world of physical objects and states that is the objective reality
we physically experience, (II) a world of subjective interpretation that hinges upon consciousness,
and (III) a world of knowledge and information that is transferable (Figure 1):
Figure 1.Three Worlds of Human Experience
Wor l d I

Wor l d I I

Wor l d I I I

MATERI ALI TY

SUBJ ECTI VI TY

I NFORMATI ON

di r ec t ex per i enc e of
phy s i c al obj ec t s &
phy s i ol ogi c al s t at es ,
i nc l udi ng mat er i al
needs , s ens es &
des i r es

s el f - k nowi ng v i a
c ogni t i v e, emot i onal ,
s oc i al & aes t het i c
s ens e; deat hawar enes s &
met aphy s i c al des i r es

body of human
k nowl edge r ec or ded on
mat er i al s ubs t r at es &
t r ans mi t t ed as
i nf or mat i on i n
mat er i al f or m

Rudimentarily, we can associate Popper’s three worlds of human experience with our
system of legal rights and penalties (Figure 2):
Figure 2.Legal Protections and Sanctions
Ri ght s

pr oper t y r i ght s
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r i ght s / f r eedoms of
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MATERI ALI TY
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I NFORMATI ON

pr oper t y l os s

l os s of l i f e,
l i ber t y , pr i v ac y

c ens or s hi p

Sanct i ons

302

See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).

303

See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that marital privacy is a protected
right under the Constitution).
304

KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 153 (1972).
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Law operates on conscious subjectivity. We fear death and imprisonment, and appreciate
life and liberty for more than what they do to our physical bodies. The philosopher Descartes
described our perception of certain nonphysical entities such as morals, justice, virtues, and truth
as consciously “real,” and evolutionary biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky named their “somber
companions” as fear, anxiety, and death awareness.305 These produce the deterrent effect of legal
sanctions vis-à-vis conscious subjectivity in World II.
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court found McCain-Feingold unconstitutional by
portraying organizations as simply another form that citizens could take to exercise their speech
rights.306 In Hobby Lobby, similarly, the Court that, “protecting the free-exercise rights of
corporations like Hobby Lobby . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and
control those companies.”307 By contrast to human beings, however, organizations have no inner
life or associated subjective self-consciousness by which to exercise these rights. Organizations
have only a material existence in World I;308 yet World II subjectivity acts both as a filter of
experience that carries with it the possibility of empathy, and as the locus of fear that enhances the
deterrent effect of legal sanctions in the world of human beings.
This substantially explains why corporate crime is estimated to be far more common than
any other kind of crime. 309 It is a form of empathy failure stemming from organizations’ lack of
subjectivity; or, more precisely, from their lack of what Otto Neurath called “intersubjectivity,”
with human beings consequent to having an entirely different kind of existence. 310 Thus, Professor
Reich observed of corporate polluters during the early environmental rights movement that their
combination of “vital factors of bureaucracy, organization, and technology” had produced “a
powerful momentum of their own” that was simply “indifferent” to the interests held by entire
classes of people.311
In contrast, citizenship in the modern liberal state defines the formal relationship
between human beings in political community with each other. It is a combination of material
aspects, such as rights of residence, and subjective ones, such as participation in deliberation over
a common destiny by voting. 312 We can in fact note this same distinction between subjective and
305

ECCLES & ROBINSON, supra note 279, at 121 (quoting Descartes), 25 (quoting Dobzhansky).

306

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372.

307

Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2768.

308

Organizations are therefore fundamentally changed by alteration of their assets; a person, in contrast,
experiences a continuity of self from birth until death despite undergoing significant material changes. See generally
Kirsty L. Spalding, et al., Dynamics of Fat Cell Turnover in Humans, 453 NATURE 783 (2008); Olaf Bergmann, et al.,
Evidence for Cardiomyocyte Renewal in Humans 324 SCI. 98 (2009).
309

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND & DONALD R. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 44-47 (1978). In law, the exemplary
case is that of the Ford Pinto, which had a design defect that led the fuel tank to explode on rear end collisions. Aware of
the defect, Ford decided not to recall the cars based on a cost-benefit analysis that showed an $11 per vehicle repair
necessary to correct the defect exceeded an estimated cost of $49.5 million to reimburse for death and injury; in 2014,
General Motors was accused of similar reasoning concerning an ignition defect. See Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness,
MOTHER JONES (1977), available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness; RICHARD A. POSNER,
TORT LAW: CASES & ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 225-26 (1982).
310

Otto Neurath, Protocol Sentences, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM 199-208 (A. J. Ayer ed., 1959).

311

CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 13-14 (Bantam 1971).

312

Sociologist Gershon Shafir defines citizenship as “the transcendence of the instrumental sphere of
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material ends in the definition of selfhood given by contemporary philosopher Michael J. Sandel:
[The self] means there is always a distinction between the values I have and the
person I am . . . . [T]he shape of this “me” must be given prior to any of the
aims or attributes I bear. One consequence of this distance is to put the self
itself beyond the reach of its experience, to secure its identity once and for all.
Or to put the point another way, it rules out the possibility of what we might call
constitutive ends.313

Subj ec t i v i t y
i nt er pr et at i on

c ondui t t o s hapi ng Wor l d I I

ex per i enc e

Wor l d I I

Legal r egul at i on of expr essi on

Mat er i al i t y

c ondui t t o s hapi ng Wor l d I

Wor l d I

Democr at i c choi ce and t he mar ket

Organizations, by contrast, are explicitly constituted for ends without which they would
not exist at all. Even an organization whose purpose is to serve human beings’ moral goals cannot
“itself” possess the metaphysical attributes that would lead it to pursue the good for its own sake.
It stands in instrumental relation to its ends, even if they are moral. This is the case with nonprofit
organizations like Citizens United; and was precisely the point the Supreme Court made about
corporate personhood in the nineteenth century. 314
Now that we have understood this key difference, we can return to McCain-Feingold.
That law was an attempt to regulate the relationship between some of the most powerful
organizations in our society and the mass broadcast and persuasive “electioneering
communication” that their treasuries could purchase to influence the electorate. We can describe
this as a regulation of the pass-through point between material wealth (World I) and persuasive
forms of mass media (World III) as a means to influence individual voter subjectivity (World II):
Figure 3. Pass-through
Points

Wor l d I I I
I nf or mat i on
medi a

Mat er i al weal t h
c ondui t t o s hapi ng Wor l d I I I

necessity, in which we toil to satisfy our material wants, into the sphere of freedom where the practice of freedom, in a
collective rational and moral deliberation over a common destiny, is its own reward.” Gershon Shafir, Introduction: The
Evolving Tradition of Citizenship, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES: A READER 1, 3 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).
313

SANDEL, supra note 131, at 162.

314

See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 553, 637-38; see also KANT, supra note 62 and associated text.
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Much critical thought was devoted during the twentieth century to the impact of mass media on
individual consciousness. Observing social changes wrought by the rise of television, journalist
George Trow described a “grid of two hundred million” and a “grid of intimacy” as the two poles
of American experience in a televised culture in which the “middle distance had fallen away.” 315
Political scientist Robert Putnam empirically and precisely identified the depopulated space where
local civic activity had starkly declined since the emergence of television. 316 Sociologist David
Riesman theorized a shift in individuals from “inner-directed” to “other-directed” personality
coinciding with the rise of mass media, 317 and psychologist Sherry Turkle found that while
communications technologies lent unprecedented control and convenience in interpersonal
relationships, they generated a feeling of being “alone together.” 318 These effects have been
detected even at the geopolitical level, where economist Jeffrey D. Sachs identified as a
significant threat to growth and social order a “distracted society” in places of affluence and hightech communication like the United States. 319
Well before television, Antonio Gramsci noted that World I’s distinct ontological status
meant that it could be captured or coopted by nonhuman actors, such as the state or other
organizations, introducing the term “hegemony” to describe the power of cultural institutions like
the media for purposes of social control.320 Walter Lippmann studied public opinion and famously
coined the term “stereotype” to explain how people form opinions about what they do not
know.321 What we “believe to be a true picture,” Lippmann said, “we treat as if it were the
environment itself.”322 In an ever-more complex world, we rely heavily on what others say to craft
our understandings of it. We become more susceptible to persuasive new forms of
“iconography.”323 As Vaclav Havel noted when taking the helm of the world’s newest democracy
315

TROW, supra note 167, at 47.

316

See PUTNAM, supra note 45, at 61-63.

317

DAVID RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMERICAN CHARACTER 13-21
(1961); but see Talcott Parsons & Winston White, The Link Between Character and Society, in CULTURE AND SOCIAL
CHARACTER: THE WORK OF DAVID RIESMAN REVIEWED 89-135 (Seymour Martin Lipset & Leo Lowenthal eds., 1961)
(refuting Riesman and presenting an alternative explanation).
318
See generally SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY &
LESS FROM EACH OTHER (2011).
319
JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE PRICE OF CIVILIZATION: REAWAKENING AMERICAN VIRTUE & PROSPERITY
133-58 (2011). A half-century earlier, historian David M. Potter made a similar assertion that television aimed to “fix the
attention but not the mind.” DAVID M. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE AMERICAN
CHARACTER (1954).
320
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 245 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey
Nowell Smith eds. and trans., 1971); see generally JACQUES ELLUL, PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN’S
ATTITUDES (Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner trans., 1965).
321

WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 18-19 (First Free Press 1997).

322

Id. at 4; see also IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING: INTRODUCTORY TOPICS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 134 (1997).
323
See, e.g., M.I.A.– Bad Girls (Official Behind the Scenes): Noisey Specials #08,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6-sNTOhYnU&feature=youtu.be (last visited Jun. 13, 2015) (the creative directors
of a pop music video use terms like “iconography” to explain how they convey specific ideas about gender roles, class,
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in 1995: “how easily my television image can be made to seem different from the real me.” 324
These precise kinds of concerns generated public pressure on Congress to regulate the
“ad wars” in American politics at the turn of the century by addressing its latest campaign finance
reform expressly to mass broadcast forms of “electioneering communication.” To neutralize the
concern, the Supreme Court articulated an optimistic view of an idea-marketplace made plentiful
by new kinds of technology (and those organizations that could afford to use the marketplace to
speak). Yet empirical work casts doubt on the validity of that portrayal. In a recent paper tracking
the flow of information into American households, W. Russell Neuman, Yong Jin Park, and Elliot
Panek described the increase in the ratio of supply to demand for media minutes of information,
from 82 in 1960 to 884:1 in 2005, as creating a greater than human-scale cognitive challenge.325
Two generations earlier, philosopher and law professor Jacques Ellul mused that so much
“excessive data do not enlighten the reader or the listener; they drown him . . . . [I]f he does not
want to risk losing his mind, he will merely draw a general picture.” 326 Supporting that assertion,
one recent study found broadband access to be negatively correlated to national exam scores in
middle schools.327
The “antidistortion” interest that captured some of these concerns reappeared in 2011 in
the case of W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen. of Mont.328 A Montana law prohibited
corporations from making contributions or expenditures “in connection with a candidate or a
political committee” unless from a separate, segregated fund solicited from shareholders,
employees, or members of the corporation.329 Montana’s supreme court, however, focused not on
capital but on technology, emphasizing that contemporary mass messaging had outstripped
voters’ ability to parse it: “[f]or one thing, voters generally do not have the desire, much less the
time, sophistication, or ability to sift through hours upon hours of attack ads . . . in order to
winnow truth . . . from fiction and half-truths . . . .”330 This situation, the court found, marginalizes
individual citizens’ impact on the political process because “it defies reality to suggest that
millions of dollars in slick television and Internet ads—put out by entities whose purpose and
expertise, in the first place, is to persuade people to buy what’s being sold—carry the same weight
as the flyers of citizen candidates and the letters to the editor of John and Mary Public.”331
and social meaning).
HAVEL, supra note 290. (“[t]elevision forces me to express my thoughts as sparely [sic] as possible, in
witticisms, slogans, or sound bites . . . . [H]ow easily my television image can be made to seem different from the real
me.”).
324

325

W. Russell Neuman, Yong Jin Park & Elliot Panek, Tracking the Flow of Information into the Home: An
Empirical Assessment of the Digital Revolution in the United States, 1960-2005, 6 INT’L J. COMM. 1022, 1034 (2012).
326

ELLUL, supra note 321, at 87.

327

See, e.g., Rodrigo Belo, Pedro Ferreira, & Rahul Telang, Broadband in School: Impact on Student
Performance, 60:2 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 265 (2014) (finding high levels of broadband access in Portuguese middle
schools had a negative impact on national exam scores regardless of gender, subject, or school quality).
328
W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 22-23 (Mont. 2011), overruled by Am.
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
329

W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 3.

330

Id. at 34.

331

Id. at 34-35.
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Montana’s supreme court upheld the law.
The Supreme Court overruled the decision based on Citizens United.332 Yet the variation
in judges’ reasoning within these cases about technologies of mass media suggests that the
Constitution preordains no specific theory of technology in relation to the exercise of expressive
rights, and therefore judges must develop those theories alongside their jurisprudence in cases that
require it.333 These theories are not constitutional theories, however; they are theories about the
media and about communication. The “marketplace of ideas,” for example, reflects what media
theorists call a “transmission view” of communication, which conceives of communication as a
process whereby information is transmitted and distributed.334 This justifies Buckley’s focus on
the quantity of ideas, irrespective of the money that is spent to produce them, by what kind of
entity. The marketplace of ideas is simply the transmission of information; it matters little by
whom or what means it is carried out. Citizens United relied heavily on the transmission view,
quoting from Buckley: “A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached”335 harming “society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas.”336
A “ritual view” of communication looks at it as more than simply a way of getting ideas
from one place to another. Rather, communication is a form of drama. 337 “What is arrayed before
the reader” of a newspaper, media theorist James Carey wrote in Communication as Culture, “is
not pure information but a portrayal of the contending forces in the world.”338 This view explains
Congress’ focus in McCain-Feingold on who and what is transmitting political communication
before elections, and whether their relative power in society bears a risk of “distorting” electoral
politics. This view is also at the heart of the Montana Supreme Court’s comment that “it defies
reality to suggest that millions of dollars in slick television and Internet ads—put out by entities
whose purpose and expertise, in the first place, is to persuade people to buy what’s being sold—
carry the same weight as the flyers of citizen candidates and the letters to the editor of John and
Mary Public.”339
The reason that the Supreme Court’s theory about mass media in relation to freedom of
expression prevails over Congress’ (or, in this case, Montana’s supreme court) is because of its
authoritative position as constitutional interpreter in a government of divided powers.

332

American Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).

333

See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (Harvard
Univ. Press 1980) [introduction].
334

JAMES W. CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS CULTURE: Essays on Media and Society 15 (Rev. ed. 1992).

335

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19).

336

Id. at 335 (quoting Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119).

337

CAREY, supra note 334 at 15.

338

Id. at 20.

339

W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 34-35.
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IV. CONCLUSION
You are my creator, but I am your master; - obey!340
This Article finds its place among studies of law and modernization, and has specifically
sought to understand the relationship between law and technology in the transformation of the
United States into an “organizational society” during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Working from the premise that law is an institution that reflects culture, it hypothesized that
judicial opinions can serve as artifacts of particular moments in the history of modernization and
social change.341 Noting that the United States became both highly technological and highly
“organizational” during the industrial and postindustrial periods, this article located cases
concerning the legal rights of corporations within the history of technology in order to identify
what law and society scholars Susan Silbey and Caroll Seron describe as “the relationship of these
legal practices to the macro transformations of modern society.” 342 This interest is not unique,
however, to sociologists who study law. Within the profession, one of the most cited legal
scholars of the last century, Roscoe Pound, urged us to not only follow the law in the books, but
also the “law in action.”343
The Article therefore methodologically rejected the formalist claim that legal scholarship
should confine itself to a “close reading” of the law’s own printed materials. 344 That idea is useful
because it allows the elaboration of systems of logically ordered and conceptually coherent
doctrines on which lawyers can make predictions about the outcomes of legal arguments, yet it
does little to associate legal change with what happens outside of legal institutions, making
decisions like Citizens United—which involve a complex mix of reasoning about the law,
technology, and society—extremely hard to explain. When a two hundred year-old legal concept
like “corporate personhood” suddenly becomes controversial with no change in the underlying
law, we should approach the jurisprudence that created the controversy as a “system of meaning,”
not as a “machine.”345 To do that, this Article liberally crossed doctrinal categories and time
periods and devoted very little space, for example, to mechanics of judicial review such as the
intricacies of strict scrutiny.
The Article began with a broad question: it asked how and why the United States
Supreme Court’s view of corporations’ constitutional rights could diverge so widely from
popularly held views and common sense notions of the same (roughly eighty percent of
Americans opposed the ruling in Citizens United with relatively little difference of opinion among
340

MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN: OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS 235 (1891).

The Article approached judges’ writing from an “anthropological mode,” described by historian Robert
Darnton as built upon the premise “that individual expression takes place within a general idiom, that we learn to classify
sensations and make sense of things by thinking within a framework provided by our culture.” ROBERT DARNTON, THE
GREAT CAT MASSACRE AND OTHER EPISODES IN FRENCH CULTURAL HISTORY 6 (1985). Within this frame, judicial
opinions can be viewed as artifacts “marked by the circumstances of their production.” SERGIO SISMONDO, AN
INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 11 (2010).
341

342

Seron & Silbey, supra note 29, at 33.

343

See generally Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907).

344

SERON & SIBLEY, supra note 29 at 33.

345

Id.
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Democrats (85%), Republicans (76%), and independents (81%)).346 It found that the answer
cannot be told separately from a story about specific technologies that expanded organizations’
ability to do things in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the Court’s opinion of
those technologies. Reading these strains of legal and technological history together, the Article
revealed the provenance of Citizens United to be a line of cases that adapted legal paradigms to
the rise of technologically-enabled organizations, first in jurisdiction, and then in speech. In these
cases, the Supreme Court developed a particularly technologically-optimistic and -deterministic
kind of constitutionalism as it reasoned about the role that corporations should play in our society
as it continues to modernize.
The Court maintained a kind of nineteenth-century affinity for individualism—but of a
“shifted” kind. It construed corporations as political minorities that must be protected against
majority tyranny, such as popularly enacted laws like McCain-Feingold and the Affordable Care
Act, which regulate organizations specifically as organizations. Thus in Citizens United the Court
said, referring to corporations and unions, “We find no basis for the proposition that, in the
context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored
speakers.”347 And in Hobby Lobby it said, “When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are
extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people” who own and
control the corporation.348
This Article has shown, however, that before the rise of an “organizational society” in
the United States, a corporation was not seen as providing general protection for human beings in
the sense of a complete set of rights that could be “shifted” from them. Well past the middle of the
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court described corporate rights as limited other than “where
contracts or rights of property are to be enforced.” 349 As a means of deepening the antidistortion
interest, this Article strongly critiqued the recent assertion that there is a straight and
uncomplicated line from the full set of people’s rights to those of the organizations they create,
because organizations fundamentally lack the kind of subjective consciousness that is possessed
by the human members of the political community that brings them into existence.
“Shifted personhood” is not the kind of methodological individualism that Professor
Horwitz pointed out sustained the artificial entity theory of the corporation in which organizations
are simply artificial aggregations of individuals: “artificial. . . . invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law,” in John Marshall’s formulation. 350 It combines from

Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign Financing, WASH.
POST, (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html; c.f.,
Supreme Court Favorability Reaches New Low, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 1, 2012), http://www.peoplepress.org/2012/05/01/supreme-court-favorability-reaches-new-low (poll conducted Apr. 4-15, 2012).
346

347

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 333.

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 (“the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for human beings. .
. . protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious
liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.”).
348

349
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168, 177 (Sup. Ct. 1868), overruled by United States v. Se.
Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).

See Horwitz, supra note 9, at 72 (“The artificial entity theory of the corporation . . . sought to retain the
premises of what has been called “methodological individualism,” that is the view that the only real starting point for
political or legal theory is the individual. Groups, in this view, were simply artificial aggregations of individuals. On the
other hand, it was the goal of the Realists to show that groups, in fact, had an organic unity, that the group was greater than
350
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methodological individualism the idea that the individual is the only real starting point for
political or legal theory, and from the entity theory the idea that corporations have a kind of
organic unity; they can participate in political discourse qua individuals, and even have “nerve
centers” like living beings do.351 The result is a kind of Frankenstein creation that is made up of
individuals but distinct and autonomous from them. This new “group theory” appears to have
easily slid organizations and individuals into constitutional parity with each other during the
twenty-first century.
While people seem to widely oppose this idea of parity, we have struggled with how to
debate about it. Citizens United came on the heels of the financial crisis of 2008, and the outcry
over “corporate personhood” it provoked was focused on the interests of those who have capital
versus those who do not.352 This directed analytic resources towards questions of class and away
from questions of technology that were deeply central to the legislation the case overturned. This
deeply obscured proper analysis of the case. There is little room to consider the particular role of
technology within an argument that contends that Citizens United is part of a “campaign to
increase corporations’ legal rights”353 or, conversely, that it articulates a reality so obvious and
vital to American ways of being and doing as to be innocuous: “Corporations are people, my
friend.”354
While acknowledging that the association between legal order and class oppression has a
legitimate history,355 this article went mostly around the conventional outlines of the corporate
personhood debate in an attempt to illuminate what is less well understood than class and power
differentials between individuals and corporations: the relationship between technology and the
law. It argued that McCain-Feingold was an active attempt to regulate technology, rather than to
simply allow it to “scale up” the electoral process to a series of “slickly produced television
clashes” funded by corporations and unions.356 Citizens United and Buckley v. Valeo, in contrast,
combined optimism about technologies of mass media as maximixing factors in the “marketplace
of ideas” with deterministic reasoning about their effect on the constitutional protection of
freedom of expression. These cases articulate that the law should lag behind technological
change,357 allowing, in the formulation of STS scholars Leo Marx and Roe Smith, “technology to
drive history.”358
the mere sum of its parts.”); Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 543.
351

See Hertz, supra note 118, and associated text.

The “Occupy Wall Street” movement viewed Citizens United as proof that the Supreme Court was
willing to use its power to shore up the position of elite class allies. See, e.g., M.J. Lee, “Occupy Courts” to Hit Citizens
United, POLITICO (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71711.html.
352

353

Editorial, The Rights of Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at A30.

354

Mitt Romney, U.S. presidential candidate, Speech at the Iowa State Fair (Aug. 11, 2011) (responding to

355

See, e.g., William J. Chambliss, A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 12 SOCIAL PROBLEMS

hecklers).
67-77 (1964).
356

See Zeleney, supra note 168.

357

See generally Richard L. Abel, Law as Lag: Inertia as a Social Theory of Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 785-

809 (1982).
358

Marx & Smith, supra note 19.
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We have perhaps failed to recognize judges’ reasoning about technology in these
decisions because it becomes “blackboxed” within them and simply not seen as instrumental to
the holdings.359 The Article argued that this phenomenon resulted in an analytic failure to
distinguish Austin and McConnell as presenting two different kinds of antidistortion interests: the
first concerning a regulation of capital (of contributions and expenditures) and the latter a
regulation of technology (of “electioneering communication”). “Blackboxing” occurs because
judges hew to traditional “rights talk” when they encounter technology management questions
within the bounds of constitutional cases. This is understandable because judges, like scientists,
are professionally constrained by rules of logical inquiry that do not allow them to transparently
do normative work, such as concerning the management of technology in society. 360 Yet “rights
talk” places judges’ reasoning about the complex relationship between technology, organizations,
and society within the bounds of a traditionally understood justification for the existence of
countermajoritarian institutions like the federal courts.
This has an implication in these types of technology cases. Justice Kennedy’s musings
about television in Citizens United become part of “the law,” which is both a structure and a
mechanism of social order. His optimism about a technologically-mediated “marketplace of
ideas” prevails over Congress’ vision of a society in which the “ad wars” are tamped down by
regulations, like McCain-Feingold. This does what Professor Cover described as “violence”
towards the vision of society chosen against, and to those who hold that vision. 361 When we fail to
see judges’ reasoning about technology as part of their legal reasoning, we fail to hold them
accountable for the harm done by their mandated technological orders—mandated because carried
forth as a matter of constitutional interpretation whose effects cannot be reversed through
ordinary legislation. Thus, this article sought to do two things: (1) raise questions of political
theory concerning how judicial review fits into the fabric of majoritarian democracy in a
technological age, and (2) sensitize judges to the hubris that allows them to let their norms
supercede the legislature’s when they reason about the technologies that enable the exercise of
particular freedoms.
Pointing, in particular, to the Internet, the majority in Citizens United suggested that the
antidote to mass media in politics was not more and better legislation, but more and better
technology.362 However, there are reasons to doubt that the Internet can serve as a more
democratic alternative to television. For instance, hundreds of thousands of Americans blog about
politics, yet search engines concentrate online news audiences on the top corporate media
outlets.363 Google is widely perceived as a tool for finding what simply “exists” online, but
Google views its search results as a form of corporate speech protected under the First
This is another contribution from STS, which has described the “blackboxing” of normative choices
within scores of technical objects. See, e.g., Trevor Pinch & Wiebe Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts:
Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other, 14:3 SOCIAL STUDIES OF
SCIENCE (1984).
359

360

Michel Foucault, who studied the history of systems of thought, showed how historical anachronism
functions similarly in the production of scientific knowledge despite its logical-rational frame. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 135-95 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon 1972).
361

See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364 (“Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and
social networking Web sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues.”).
362

363

See MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 135 (2009).
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Amendment,364 and modifies those results as it sees fit in a way computer scientist and professor
of information Christian Sandvig describes as an “algorithmic allocation of attention.” 365 Under a
recent federal court ruling, the physical deliverers of online content—internet service providers,
or “ISPs”—have no obligation to provide equal access or to deliver content at equal speeds. 366
ISPs already are substantially aligned with the corporate interests of cable television. 367 Thus,
twenty-first century communication technologies and the nodal, decentralized and flexible
networks they make possible368 do not necessarily portend a shift of power outside of capital-rich
organizations in our era. Technologies cost money to produce. Even if they are freely given to us,
they continue to be expressions of the interests of capital.369
However, nor do we here need to rely on a polarizing class critique, which views the
mass media as part of an ideological superstructure driving a wedge of false consciousness into
individuals.370 For at least two generations, sociologists have urged us to recognize that modern
power lies not only with the “exploitative capitalist or an imperialist general or a narrow-minded
bureaucrat,” but also in “the efficient structure of modern organizations.” 371 We can therefore
express concern about the Supreme Court ceding the First Amendment to the momentum of largescale sociotechnical systems of mass communication by underwriting its legal reasoning with
“Pollyanna-ish” reasoning about technology and organizations, while avoiding becoming mired in
364

See Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf (paper commissioned
by Google).
365
Christian Sandvig, Corrupt Personalization, SOCIAL MEDIA COLLECTIVE: RESEARCH BLOG (June 26,
2014), available at http://socialmediacollective.org/2014/-6/26/corrupt-personalization/; See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Google
Punishes Site in Ranking Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2013, at C2 (suppressing search results in retaliation against
RapGenius); Claire Cain Miller & Mark Scott, Google Settles Its European Antitrust Case; Critics Remain, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/technology/google-reaches-tentative-antitrust-settlementwith-european-union.html?_r=0 (alleging alteration of search results to promote business interests).
366
See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In the recent “net neutrality” decision, the
D.C. Circuit found that that the FCC had relinquished its right to regulate Internet service providers (ISPs) as common
carriers. Id.
367

See Saul Hansell, Media Megadeal: The Overview; America Online Agrees to Buy Time Warner for
$165 Million; Media Deal is Richest Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at A1. In 2000, internet company America
Online and cable television company Time Warner merged to form the largest media company in the world, and in 2014
cable and internet company Comcast moved to acquire the merged Time Warner Cable. Id.; David Gelles, Comcast Deal
Seeks to Unite 2 Cable Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/comcast-set-toacquire-time-warner-cable/.
368

See generally ALEA M. FAIRCHILD, TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF VIRTUAL ORGANIZATIONS (2003);
Michael E. Porter, Clusters and the New Economics of Competition, HARV. BUS. REV. 77 (reprinted in 1998).
369

Illustrating how technical things are inscribed with socio-economic relations is another central
contribution of STS. See, e.g., Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics? 109 DAEDALUS 121, 122, 126-27 (1980); Jim
Johnson, Mixing Humans and Nonhumans: The Sociology of a Door-Closer, 35 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 298, 308-10 (1988).
370

GRAMSCI, supra note 321, at 12.

371

PETER M. BLAU & RICHARD A. SCHOENHERR, THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATIONS 357 (1971). See
also REICH, supra note 296, at 13 (observing corporate polluters during the early environmental rights movement that their
combination of “vital factors of bureaucracy, organization, and technology” produced “a powerful momentum of their own
that may not be inconsistent with class interests, but may well be indifferent to them.”).
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the gridlock of “class warfare” by accusing the Court of intentionally engaging in it.
We must continue to unpack the debate over “corporate personhood” because
technological orders established by constitutional decision-making will be significantly harder to
alter than those by legislation, no matter how dystopian the results. Dystopian is how some
describe deliberative democracy in its present form in the United States. Relying on Citizens
United, the D.C. Circuit in Speechnow.org inaugurated the era of the “Super PAC” by holding
unanimously that organizations making independent expenditures that support or oppose
candidates, cannot be restricted in receiving contributions of any size from any source. 372 Super
PACs qualify for tax-exempt status as social welfare groups under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code as long as they spend no more than fifty percent of their resources on explicitly
political activities; they also need not disclose their donors. 373 The fifty-percent rule has proven
difficult to enforce, and money from obscure sources has flowed massively into political contests
large and small across the country. 374
The use of Super PACs, like the use of television, has swept across party lines and
ideological differences. After becoming the first presidential candidate to abandon public
financing in 2008,375 Barack Obama became the first sitting president to utilize a Super PAC; his
former campaign manager David Axelrod described the creation of these organizations as an
“arms race” in which the Democratic Party could not afford to step down.376 In 2011, the FCC
formally abandoned the Fairness Doctrine on grounds that new expansive media sources like
cable television and the Internet had eliminated the broadcast scarcity on which the justification
for “equal time” rested.377 In the last presidential election, some candidates simply used their
campaigns “as promotional tours for books, movies, and their own personal brands.” 378
At the first stirrings of the Industrial Age, Mary Shelley told a tale about an inventor
losing control of his creation. Often lost in the retelling is the fact that Dr. Frankenstein’s aim was
not to create a monster, but a creature to do good. So too the growth of organizations in our
372

Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

373

See Chick & Henchey, supra note 4, at 6, 11.

374
See, e.g., Jeremy Singer-Vine, How Much are Super PAC’s Spending? (2012),
http://www.cairchicago.org/2012/08/06/super-pacs-changing-the-nature-of-the-game/; Matea Gold, Koch-Backed Political
Network, Built to Shield Donors, Raised $400 Million in 2012 Elections, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2014, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/koch-backed-political-network-built-to-shield-donors-raised-400-million-in2012-elections/2014/01/05/9e7cfd9a-719b-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html.
375

See, e.g., 2008 Presidential Campaign Financial Activity Summarized: Receipts Nearly Double 2004
Total, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, June 8, 2009, http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml. No
presidential candidate since the initiation of public funding in 1971 had declined to use public funding. Id. After a high
point of $240 million, the fund decreased to $139 million in 2008. Id. Barack Obama became the first ever major party
nominee to refuse it, allowing him to raise a total of $745 million. Id. John McCain accepted $84.1 million in public funds
after raising $46.4 million in private funds, and he was defeated. Id.
376

Zeleney & Rutenberg, supra note 4.

377
Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Genachowski Continues Regulator Reform to Ease Burden on
Businesses;
Announces
Elimination
of
83
Outdated
Rules
(Aug.
22,
2011),
available
at
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-309224A1.pdf. Fairness Doctrine equivalents are still widely in effect
as a form of electoral regulation throughout Europe.
378

Zeleney, supra note 160.
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society has been driven by our desire to find ways to live better and accomplish things in modern
times. Their suitability in this regard is why Max Weber linked corporations’ emergence to the
need for large-scale organization in modern industrial societies, and why he found them present
irrespective of substantial differences in the surrounding form of political economy, such as
whether it was democratic capitalism or socialism. 379
Oliver Wendell Holmes once described the theory of our Constitution as “an experiment,
as all life is an experiment,” in which “we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge.”380 If our organizations become our monsters, it is because we have
allowed it. Long before Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, Professor Tushnet put us on notice of a
“well-worn path” by which corporations had “moved from the legislative arena, in which they had
lost, to the judicial arena, where they succeeded in persuading the judges to rule that
constitutional interests were at stake.”381 This is precisely what early corporate entity theory
dissenter Justice Daniel predicted as the result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Letson. He
described it as rendering a corporation “equal to a release from the thralldom of constitutional
restriction, and made competent at any rate to the power of commanding the action of the federal
courts.”382 Similarly, Dr. Frankenstein’s creature eventually said: “You are my creator, but I am
your master; - obey! . . . Beware for I am fearless, and therefore powerful.” 383
Finally, this Article offers a brief word on further research. We have long had a deepseated cultural optimism about technology in the United States. A fruitful direction for further
analysis will be to compare the evolution of the legal status of organizations in places with
different perspectives on technological innovation, such as in Europe, where regulation of
political communication is an area of significant regulatory contrast to the United States. 384 My
colleague Emanuel Bertrand, who is a member of the Science and Democracy Network, has noted
a discursive trend of inclusion of organizations in political discourse as a proxy for individual
civil society participation in the European Union. 385 This is comparable to the rise of
organizations in political discourse in the United States, and it would be interesting to see if there
is a joint evolution in their constitutional status as speakers. 386 Further, while this article has dealt
379

WEBER, supra note 28, at 337-38.

380

Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

381

Tushnet, supra note 281, at 254.

382

Marshall, 57 U.S. at 344 (1853) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (using the French word deterré, meaning
literally “to unearth” to describe the corporation’s use of the judicial system).
383

SHELLEY, supra note 341, at 235-36.

384

Regarding technology, Europe as an example, experienced authoritarian uprisings during the twentieth
century that harnessed technological innovation to negative effect, resulting in an overall more “precautionary” approach
than in the United States. See, e.g., ROBERT PAARLBERG, THE POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2001); SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES 280-87 (2005) (arguing that democratic decisionmaking has an important role to play in technology
management and illustrating how that has been the case more in Europe than in the United States for, example, genetically
modified food).
385
See generally Emanuel Bertrand, The Participation of Organized Civil Society as Seen by the European
Commission: The Discursive Regime of Participative Governance, Science and Democracy Network Tenth Annual
Meeting (Paris, June 25-27, 2012) (on file with the author).
386

See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations
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with organizational freedom of action under Article III and the First Amendment, its conclusions
should be tested against analysis of disputes over organizational rights under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, and disputes over assigning to them higher-order responsibilities, such as
humanitarian ones under the law of nations. 387 An interesting other line of historical analysis
would consider why radio, which was primarily regional, did not draw the same legislative or
judicial attention concerning the political speech of organizations as did television.
In 2010, the Wall Street Journal commended the Supreme Court for its decision in
Citizens United, calling it the “branch of government that seems to understand technology
best.”388 The simplicity of that conclusion—that the Supreme Court even has a point of view
about technology—is reinforced by the fact that it has imposed an absolute, half-century ban on
televising its own courtroom activities. 389 This article has substantially fleshed out what the Court
really thinks about technology, and how that point of view has underwritten its jurisprudence
concerning certain kinds of corporate rights over two centuries. When he mused about the Internet
in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy seemed to be looking for a new technology that could return
the political conversation to individual citizens by restoring to them the power of speech, even as
Citizens United opened it evermore to organizations. The “new” technology needed is precisely
the “old” one whose results the Court overturned: that, simply, of the democratic process.

or
Between
International
Organizations,
Mar.
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_2_1986.pdf
organizations as parties).

21,
1986,
available
at
(expanding treaty-making to include

387

See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663-64 (2013) (concerning whether
corporations can be held accountable for human rights violations).
388
L. Gordon Crovitz, Tech-Savvy Justices Protect Free Speech, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704858104575232340596598422 (“The branch of government that
seems to understand technology best is the one whose members take notes on legal pads, not iPads.”).

See, e.g., WASH. POST, Souter Won’t Allow Cameras in High Court, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1996, available
at http://articles.latimes.com/1996-04-09/news/mn-56470_1_supreme-court (“The day you see a camera come into our
courtroom it’s going to roll over my dead body”); Cheryl Hanna, Court Appearance, SEVEN DAYS, Nov. 29, 2006,
available at http://www.sevendaysvt.com/vermont/court-appearance/Content?oid=2128871 (arguing that Supreme Court
arguments should be televised. Ms. Hanna was well regarded and will be deeply missed at Vermont Law School).
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